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CHAPTER I
Decentralized Borrowing and Centralized Default
with Jing Zhang
1.1 Introduction
In the past, foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost entirely
of government borrowing. Motivated by this observation, the sovereign debt literature
focuses on “centralized borrowing” models in which governments decide both how
much to borrow and whether to repay. In recent decades private external borrowing
has risen substantially from less than 20 percent of total external borrowing in 1990
to more than 70 percent in 2008, as shown in Figure 1. Private external debt is often
priced with macroeconomic indicators rather than according to individual borrowers’
ability to repay because governments play an important role in private external debt
repayments.1 In such an environment, a pecuniary externality arises because private
agents fail to internalize the impacts of their individual borrowing on credit costs.
Intuitively, such a pecuniary externality will lead to excessive borrowing.
This paper quantitatively evaluates the impact of this pecuniary externality in a
decentralized borrowing model where private agents decide how much to borrow, and
1One reason that governments affect repayments of private external debt is that developing
countries’ external debt is predominantly denominated in foreign currencies and governments control
exchange rates. A devaluation of domestic currencies can cause wide-spread defaults on private
external debt. Another reason is that governments often explicitly or implicitly guarantee private
external debt. Chile’s debt nationalization in 1982 is an example. Chilean total foreign debt reached
as high as 20 billion dollars in 1982, and two thirds was private debt by leading domestic private
banks. When the Latin American panic dried up new loans, six top private banks failed, and the
Chilean government assumed responsibility for private foreign debt. As a result, when pricing private
external loans, foreign lenders rely heavily on macroeconomic indicators of developing countries. See
Section 1.2.1 for more discussions.
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Data source: Global Development Finance
the government decides whether to default. Interestingly, the model suggests that the
quantitative effect of this pecuniary externality on debt levels is modest and ambigu-
ous. Equilibrium debt levels could be higher or lower under decentralized borrowing
than under centralized borrowing, depending on the specification and severity of de-
fault penalties. On the other hand, decentralized borrowing unambiguously generates
higher credit costs, larger default frequencies and lower welfare.
In our model, a continuum of identical households borrow non-contingent debt
from foreign lenders to smooth their income shocks. A benevolent government de-
cides whether to enforce debt repayments to maximize the welfare of the representa-
tive household. If the government defaults, the country loses access to international
financial markets and suffers income losses for some stochastic number of periods.
Foreign lenders offer the households a price schedule for debt that depends on the
level of aggregate borrowing instead of individual borrowing. This is because ag-
gregate borrowing, together with the aggregate income shock, determines the default
probability. We calibrate the model to Argentine data to examine quantitative effects
of decentralized borrowing.
The paper identifies two channels through which decentralized borrowing affects
2
debt decisions relative to the centralized borrowing model. The first is straightfor-
ward: private agents do not internalize the adverse effect of an extra unit of debt
on government default probabilities and aggregate credit costs, and therefore borrow
more for a given interest rate schedule. This overborrowing effect shifts up the de-
mand curve for debt and tends to increase equilibrium debt levels as well as credit
costs. The second channel is less obvious: the equilibrium interest rate schedule is
higher under decentralized borrowing, inducing private agents to borrow less. The in-
terest rate schedule rises because the anticipation of future overborrowing by private
agents leads to larger default likelihood of the government for any debt level. This
bond price schedule effect shifts up the supply curve of debt and tends to reduce debt
levels while at the same time increasing credit costs. Thus, equilibrium debt levels
depend on the relative strength of the two channels.
Since default penalties play a central role in quantitative results, we examine two
commonly-used specifications of default penalties. The first is an asymmetric default
penalty, in which income losses after default are disproportionately large under good
income shocks.2 The second is a symmetric default penalty, in which income losses
after default are a constant share of income. Under asymmetric default penalties,
decentralized borrowing generates higher debt levels than centralized borrowing when
default penalties are lenient, but lower debt levels when default penalties are harsh.
Under symmetric default penalties, equilibrium debt levels are always lower under
decentralized borrowing.
To understand the impact of decentralized borrowing on equilibrium debt levels,
let us consider the two counteracting effects determining equilibrium debt. The over-
borrowing effect arises from the failure of private agents to internalize the impact of
their additional borrowing on credit costs, so operates only when agents take on risky
debt. The more sensitive credit costs are to aggregate borrowing, the stronger is the
2Proposed by Arellano (2008), this specification of default penalties helps the centralized bor-
rowing model generate an empirically reasonable default rate.
3
overborrowing effect. The bond price schedule effect occurs because the overborrow-
ing incentive lowers the repayment welfare and drives up the default likelihood of the
government. The greater the decrease in the repayment welfare is, the stronger is the
bond price schedule effect.
With symmetric default penalties, the overborrowing effect barely operates be-
cause agents rarely borrow risky debt. Thus, the bond price schedule effect domi-
nates, leading to equilibrium underborrowing. With asymmetric default penalties,
agents are more likely to borrow risky debt and the overborrowing effect operates.
When default penalties are lenient, credit costs are sensitive to aggregate risky bor-
rowing because the government’s incentive to default rises rapidly with additional
debt. The reduction in the repayment welfare from decentralized borrowing is small
because default is not that costly. Thus, the overborrowing effect is strong while the
bond price schedule effect is weak, which leads to equilibrium overborrowing. When
default penalties are severe, credit costs are less sensitive to risky borrowing, but
the repayment welfare is lowered substantially under decentralized borrowing. Thus,
the overborrowing effect is weak while the bond price schedule effect is strong, which
leads to equilibrium underborrowing.
Our work is related to Jeske (2006) and Wright (2006), who study theoretically
the impact of decentralized borrowing in an environment with complete markets and
default risk. Our paper examines such effects quantitatively in an environment with
incomplete markets and default risk.3 Our work relates to many studies that analyze
the effect of pecuniary externalities coming from other sources in debt markets. Bizer
and DeMarzo (1992) studies an externality arising from sequential borrowing from
multiple lenders. Bi (2006) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) examine the Bizer-
DeMarzo type of externality in quantitative sovereign debt models. Lorenzoni (2008)
studies an externality arising from failure of private investors to take into account the
3Bai and Zhang (2010) show that both incomplete markets and default risk are important to
account for various dimensions of international data, for example, savings and investment behavior.
4
effect of private asset sales on asset prices.
Our work is also related to Uribe (2006) who shows that regardless of whether a
debt limit is imposed at the country level or at the individual level, the equilibrium
level of debt is the same. In his analysis, debt limits and interest rates are exogenously
specified, and there is no default risk. By contrast, in our model, the presence of
default risk endogenizes both interest rates and debt limits, and whether interest
rates depend on aggregate debt or individual debt affects the equilibrium level of
debt.4
Our model builds on the classic sovereign default framework of Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1981) and recent quantitative research on sovereign debt: Arellano (2008),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), among others. Recently, different approaches have
been taken to enrich and improve the sovereign debt model. Bai and Zhang (2009))
introduce production economies to the sovereign debt literature. Cuadra and Sapriza
(2008) and Hatchondo et al. (2009) incorporate political economy considerations into
the government’s decision. Arellano and Ramanarayan (2010), Chatterjee and Eyi-
gungor (2010) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) consider long-duration bonds.
Yue (2010) and Benjamin and Wright (2009) take renegotiations and settlements
into consideration. All these papers examine equilibrium outcomes under centralized
borrowing. Our paper instead studies outcomes under decentralized borrowing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model
with decentralized borrowing. In section 1.3, we compare the quantitative implica-
tions of the models with decentralized and centralized borrowing. Section 1.4 investi-
gates how different default penalties affect the quantitative results, in particular, the
equilibrium debt level. We conclude in section 1.5.
4Interest rates depend on aggregate debt in the decentralized borrowing model. By contrast, one
can interpret that interest rates depend on individual borrowing in the centralized borrowing model,




This section presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of decentralized
borrowing and centralized default in which borrowing decisions are made by individual
households and default decisions are made by a government. This setup is intended
to capture an environment in which borrowing decisions are made by private agents
and lending decisions of foreign lenders are guided by aggregate indicators rather than
individual borrowers’ ability to repay. By comparing with the centralized borrowing
model this section highlights the pecuniary externality arising from decentralized
borrowing.
1.2.1 Model with Decentralized Borrowing
The model economy consists of three types of agents: a continuum of identical house-
holds and a sovereign government in a small open economy, and foreign lenders.
The households receive stochastic aggregate income shocks y, which follow a Markov
process with the transition function f(y′, y). In order to smooth income shocks, the
households trade non-contingent bonds b with risk-neutral foreign lenders. The benev-
olent government, maximizing its representative household’s welfare, decides whether
to enforce foreign debt contracts.5 In each period, the country is either in the normal
phase with access to international financial markets or in the penalty phase without
access to financial markets.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of each period, the income shock y is
realized. If the country is in the normal phase, the government decides whether to
5Broner and Ventura (2010) analyze an environment with both domestic and international trade
of contingent claims among private agents. They assume that the government, when deciding
whether to enforce the claims, cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors. We
implicitly allow discrimination. Our framework is equivalent to the one in which both domestic
and international borrowing and lending are allowed, and the government always enforces domestic
contracts, but not necessarily international contracts. Given that households are identical, domestic
borrowing and lending are never observed in equilibrium.
6
enforce the repayment of outstanding foreign debt B.6 If the government enforces
debt contracts, the households repay their debt b and decide on consumption c and
next-period debt b′. If the government defaults, the households do not to repay their
debt, and the economy goes into the penalty phase. The country in the penalty phase
suffers from income loss and has probability θ of reverting to the normal phase each
period.
Government
At the beginning of the normal period, the benevolent government observes current
income shock y and aggregate foreign debt B. The government decides whether
to enforce debt contracts to maximize the representative household’s welfare. This
welfare is given by vD(y) if the government chooses to default, and vR(B, y,Γ (B, y))
if the government chooses to enforce the repayment with an anticipation that the
economy will borrow B′ = Γ (B, y) this period. Thus, the government solves the
following problem:
D(B, y) = arg max
d∈{0,1}
{
(1− d) vR(B, y,Γ (B, y)) + d vD (y)
}
, (1)
where d = 1 indicates default and d = 0 indicates repayment. If the repayment welfare
vR is greater than the default welfare vD, then the government enforces the repayment
of individual debt contracts. Otherwise, the government decides to declare default.
Our assumption that national governments make default choices highlights default
risk, driven by national governments, of private debt contracts. The governments
can impose exchange or capital controls to prevent private agents from repaying their
debt or assume repayment responsibilities to foreign creditors by nationalizing private
foreign debt.
6A positive B denotes foreign assets, and a negative B denotes foreign debt.
7
Foreign Lenders
Foreign lenders are risk neutral. They operate in competitive international finan-
cial markets and have the opportunity cost of funds at the risk-free interest rate r.
They thus have to break even for each debt contract. Since the government’s de-
fault decisions are based on aggregate debt, the bond price schedule also depends
on aggregate debt. For any aggregate borrowing level B′, the lender expects to re-
ceive the repayment B′ next period if and only if the government enforces repayment




B′ (1−D(B′, y′)) f(y′, y)dy′. The resource cost of this debt contract to the
lender today is q(B′, y)B′. The zero profit condition requires that the resource cost





(1−D(B′, y′)) f(y′, y)dy′
1 + r
. (2)
If the government will enforce repayment under all future income shocks, the bond
price is simply the inverse of the gross risk-free rate. However, if the government
defaults for some future income shocks, the bond price is lower to compensate for the
default risk.
The centralized default decision for decentralized borrowing implies that credit
terms for private debt depends critically on aggregate debt. This implication is con-
sistent with empirical evidence. Using firm-level observations from 30 countries for
1995–2004, Borensztein et al. (2007) show that sovereign ratings are a significant de-
terminant of credit ratings assigned to corporations in emerging market economies.
Similar findings are presented in Agca and Celasun (2009), Ferri and Liu (2003),
Fernandez-Arias and Lombardo (1998), and Mendoza and Yue (2010). Major rating
agencies’ practices also support this implication. For example, Standard and Poor’s
8
(2001) stresses that sovereign credit risk is always a key consideration in the assess-
ment of the credit standing of banks and corporations in emerging markets. Their
main argument is that governments in financial distress or default may force private
sector to default by imposing exchange controls and other restrictive measures.
Individual Households
We now describe the individual household’s problem. A measure one continuum of
infinitely-lived identical households have flow utility u(c) over consumption c, where
u (·) is increasing and strictly concave. If the country is in the normal phase and
the government decides to repay, then the households can trade one-period non-
contingent bonds b′. The households take as given the aggregate borrowing level B′
and the associated bond price q(B′, y). In addition, the households also take as given
the default decision of the government D(B′, y′).
Hence, a household with bond holding b and income shock y solves:
vR(b, y, B′) = max
b′





(1−D (B′, y′)) vR(b′, y′, B′′) +D (B′, y′) vD (y′)
]
f(y′, y)dy′
s.t. B′′ = Γ(B′, y′),
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and B′′ = Γ(B′, y′) is aggregate bonds that
the economy will issue next period if the government continues to enforce repayment.
Aggregate borrowing B′ plays an important role in each household’s decision; it pins
down the cost of borrowing today, the government’s default decision next period, and
future aggregate borrowing B′′.
If the government decides to default, the households do not repay their debt
but lose access to international financial markets. In each period, the economy has
probability θ of regaining access to international financial markets with zero debt
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obligations. During the exclusion periods, the households suffer from income loss;
their income drops from y to ydef . The default welfare is given by




θvR(0, y′, B′′) + (1− θ)vD(y′)
]
f(y′, y)dy′, (4)
s.t. B′′ = Γ(0, y′).
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium of this economy is a list of (i) individual value
functions and policy functions: vR, vD, c, and b′, (ii) a government default decision
function D(B, y), (iii) an actual law of motion for aggregate debt B′ = Γ(B, y), and
(iv) a bond price schedule q(B′, y) such that
1. Given q,Γ and D, the value and policy functions solve the household’s problem.
2. The household’s policy function b′ is consistent with Γ.
3. Given Γ, D(B, y) solves the government’s problem.
4. The bond price schedule q(B′, y) ensures foreign lenders’ break-even in expected
value.
1.2.2 Model with Centralized Borrowing
We compare our decentralized borrowing model with the standard Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1981) type model of centralized borrowing. All aspects of the model with cen-
tralized borrowing are identical to the model with decentralized borrowing, except one
difference. In the centralized borrowing model, the government, instead of the house-
holds, makes the borrowing decision.7 We briefly describe the centralized borrowing
7One can alternatively think of the government’s problem as the representative household’s prob-
lem.
10
model. The government’s value function is
W (B, y) = max
d∈{0,1}
{
(1− d)WR(B, y) + dWD(y)
}
(5)
where WR(B, y) is the repayment welfare and WD(y) is the default welfare. Let
DC(B, y) denote the government optimal default decision and qC(B
′, y) denote the
bond price schedule. The repayment welfare is given by
WR(B, y) = max
B′
u(y +B − qC(B′, y)B′) + β
∫
y′
W (B′, y′)f(y′, y)dy′. (6)
Note that the government chooses aggregate debt next-period, B′, and allocates it
evenly across the households. The default welfare is defined as




θW (0, y′) + (1− θ)WD(y′)
]
f(y′, y)dy′. (7)





(1−DC(B′, y′)) f(y′, y)dy′
1 + r
. (8)
The recursive competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of a list of the
government’s value functions, {W,WR,WD}, policy functions {B′, DC} and a bond
price schedule qC(B
′, y) such that
1. Under qC , the value and policy functions solve the government’s problem.
2. The bond price qC(B
′, y) ensures foreign lenders’ break-even in expected value.
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1.2.3 Comparison of the Two Borrowing Environments
In order to facilitate exposition, we treat the value functions and the bond price
functions as differentiable in this subsection.8 The first order condition in the model

















B′ term represents the change in the bond price in response to one extra
unit of the bond. This term is not present in the corresponding first order condition
in the model with decentralized borrowing:
u′(c)q(B′, y) = β
∫
y′
(1−D(B′, y′))u′(c′)f(y′, y)dy′, (10)
since households take the bond price as given.
For expository purposes, let us compare the debt levels assuming that the bond
price schedules and the default sets are the same in the two models, that is qC = q and
DC = D. Denote the optimal bond holdings in the model with centralized borrowing




sufficiently low levels of debt, the government enforces repayments under all future
shocks and thus the economy faces the risk-free interest rate. We denote the maximum
amount of such debt by B
′
and refer to it as the safe debt limit. Then it must be
the case that ∂q(B
′,y)
∂B′
= 0 for any B′ > B
′
. This implies that B′C = B
′
D if the optimal
debt is below the safe debt limit in both models.
Now consider the effect of raising debt by one unit when B′ < B
′
. The marginal
cost is the expected loss in future utility conditional on not defaulting next period,
8The solution method employed in the quantitative analysis section does not depend on the
differentiability of the value functions and the bond price schedule.
9With decentralized borrowing, individual households choose b′D instead of B
′
D. In equilibrium,
however, individual and aggregate debt coincide. Thus, we compare aggregate debt in the two
models.
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which is the right hand side of equation (9) and (10). The marginal benefit is the
current utility gain from the resource raised by one extra unit of debt, which is the
left hand side of these two equations. We plot the marginal cost and benefit for each
model in Figure 2. The marginal costs are identical across the two models and rise
with the debt level.10 The marginal benefits in both models decline with the debt
level. Moreover, the marginal benefit is higher under decentralized borrowing since
∂q(B′,y)
∂B′
> 0 and B
′∂q(B′,y)
∂B′
< 0. At the optimal debt level, the marginal benefit equals
the marginal cost. This implies that B′C > B
′
D, and so the households would like to
borrow more under decentralized borrowing.
Figure 2: Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs of Debt



















Notes: The marginal cost and benefit of an additional unit of debt in the centralized borrowing model are plotted
for a country with an endowment shock at the 60th percentile and a debt level about 34% of income using the model
solution. The marginal benefit in the decentralized borrowing model is constructed using the bond price schedule in
the centralized borrowing model.
When making borrowing decisions, the government internalizes the adverse effect
of additional borrowing on the bond price, but individual households, acting as price
takers, do not.11 Thus, decentralized borrowing generates a pecuniary externality
10In principle, marginal costs might decrease with debt if default probabilities rise rapidly with
debt.
11The externality resembles the one studied in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). In their paper,
individual banks do not internalize the effects of their own liability structure on the aggregate
liability structure. This externality induces relatively more debt financing in individual banks’
liability structure, and leads to an over-levered aggregate balance sheet.
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where one individual’s actions affect another individual’s welfare through prices.12
Pecuniary externalities by themselves are not a source of inefficiency since they work
within the market mechanism through prices. However, they do cause efficiency losses
and lower welfare if there are other market imperfections such as incomplete markets
and limited enforcement in the model.13
The above discussions assume that the bond price and default schedules are the
same in the two models. These assumptions automatically hold if default never oc-
curs in equilibrium and the bond price schedule is an exogenous function of aggregate
debt. In this case, decentralized borrowing unambiguously leads to overborrowing in
equilibrium.14 However, in our model both the bond price and default schedules are
endogenous. Given the overborrowing incentives of the households, borrowing costs
are higher and welfare, especially the repayment welfare, is lower under decentralized
borrowing. Consequently, the government has a higher incentive to default, and the
bond price schedule is less favorable under decentralized borrowing, i.e., the default
set changes and the bond price schedule shifts. This bond price schedule effect reduces
borrowing. Hence, whether decentralized borrowing leads to equilibrium overborrow-
ing depends on which effect dominates: the overborrowing incentive or the bond price
schedule effect. We analyze quantitatively the impacts of decentralized borrowing on
the equilibrium debt level in the next section.
1.3 Quantitative Analysis
This section investigates the quantitative implications of the decentralized borrow-
ing model. In order to highlight the impacts of decentralized borrowing, we first
12Levchenko (2005) highlights another source of externality of private borrowing. When there
are heterogeneous agents and heterogeneous access to international financial markets, financial in-
tegration might break domestic risk sharing and hurt those without access to international financial
markets.
13For more discussions on efficiency losses from pecuniary externalities, see Loong and Zeckhauser
(1982) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
14This is one of the examples in Uribe (2006) and referred to as the debt-elastic country premium
case.
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compare the equilibrium dynamics of the decentralized and centralized borrowing en-
vironments. We then evaluate the ability of the decentralized borrowing model to
account for observed statistical moments of the business cycle in Argentina.
1.3.1 Calibration and Computation
We calibrate the model at the quarterly frequency. The utility has standard CRRA
form: u(c) = c
1−s−1
1−s , where the coefficient of relative risk aversion s is 2. The risk-free
interest rate is set to 1.7%, corresponding to the average quarterly interest rate of a
five-year U.S. treasury bond for the period 1983–2001. The income shock yt follows
an AR(1) process: ln(yt) = ρ ln(yt−1) + εt with |ρ| < 1 and εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε). We use the
time series of Argentina’s GDP to calibrate the shock process and estimate ρ to be
0.945 and σε to be 0.025.
The default penalty plays a crucial role in sovereign debt models. In the bench-
mark calibration, we assume that the default penalty is disproportionately large for
large income shocks, following Arellano (2008). Specifically, ydef has the following
form:
ydef =
 (1− λ)ȳ if y > (1− λ)ȳy if y ≤ (1− λ)ȳ , (11)
where ȳ denotes the unconditional mean of income shocks, and λ characterizes the
income loss after default. A larger λ makes the default penalty more severe both by
lowering the threshold income shock that is subject to income loss and by raising the
magnitude of income loss. We refer to this specification as the asymmetric default
penalty. An alternative specification is the symmetric default penalty where income
loss is a constant fraction of the income shock.
The motivation for the asymmetric default penalty is that sovereign default is often
accompanied by a drop in private credit, and so the economy would have to forgo
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disproportionately larger income under good shocks.15 In addition, with a symmetric
default penalty, sovereign debt models rarely generate equilibrium default and fail to
match the default rate observed in the data. The asymmetric default penalty makes
default attractive when the country experiences bad shocks, and thus helps raise the
default probability. Empirical support on either form of the default output cost is
rather weak despite their common use. Given the quantitative importance of the
default output cost, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the default penalties in the
next section.
The default penalty parameter λ, the discount factor β, and the re-entry proba-
bility θ are chosen such that the model with decentralized borrowing produces the 3%
default probability, 14% income drop upon default, and 1.75% standard deviation of
the trade balance observed in the Argentina data. The default penalty parameter λ
is estimated to be 0.1 and the discount factor β is 0.97. The re-entry probability θ is
estimated to be 0.1, which corresponds to 10 quarters of exclusion from international
financial markets after default. This is in line with the historical evidence presented
in Gelos et al. (2010).16 See the lower panel of Table 1 for the summary of these
parameter values.
With the functional forms and parameters described above, we solve the models
numerically using the discrete state-space technique. The decentralized borrowing
model is more difficult to compute than the centralized borrowing model. The state
space has three dimensions (b, y;B′) in the decentralized borrowing model, while it
has only two dimensions (B, y) in the centralized borrowing. Moreover, in the decen-
tralized borrowing model we need to find the aggregate borrowing function Γ(B, y)
to be consistent with individual borrowings. Such aggregate borrowing functions are
not unique in general. We discuss the detailed solution algorithm and the selection
15Mendoza and Yue (2010) present a model that generates endogenously this form of income loss.
16Gelos et al. (2010) find, for all defaulting episodes during the period of 1980–2000, that the
median exclusion length is 3 years after default.
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method for the aggregate borrowing function in Appendix A.
After solving the model, we simulate the model for 500,000 periods and find the
latest 1,000 default episodes. We extract 74 consecutive observations of the normal
period before each default event and examine the mean statistics over these samples.
The 74 observations prior to a default episode correspond to the number of quarters
between the latest two default events in Argentina.17 In the next subsection, we
compare the implications of the decentralized borrowing model with those of the
centralized borrowing model.
1.3.2 Decentralized versus Centralized Borrowing
Table 1 presents statistics for the Argentina data and for the decentralized and cen-
tralized borrowing models. The first column shows business cycle statistics for Ar-
gentina from 1983 to 2001. The annual default probability of 3% is based on three
default episodes in approximately one hundred years. The average debt over GDP
ratio of 43.36% is calculated for the period from 1983 to 2001 using Global Devel-
opment Finance. The debt statistics include total external debt of the private and
public sectors. The second column of Table 1 presents the statistics in the model
with decentralized borrowing. To highlight the role of decentralized borrowing, we
present these statistics in the model with centralized borrowing under the same set
of parameter values in the third column.
There are three striking differences between the decentralized and centralized bor-
rowing models. First, the mean spread under decentralized borrowing is higher by a
factor of more than thirty compared to the one under centralized borrowing: 11.25%
versus 0.37%. Second, the model with decentralized borrowing exhibits a much higher
default probability, 3.03%, far exceeding 0.11% in the model with centralized borrow-
ing. Third, the decentralized borrowing model generates a higher debt to income
17In the model with centralized borrowing, default is so rare that only 137 samples satisfy our
criteria. We thus compute the model statistics based on these 137 samples.
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Table 1: Comparison of Decentralized and Centralized Borrowing
Statistics Data Model
Decentralized Centralized 1 Centralized 2
mean(spread) 10.31 11.25 0.37 7.30
std(spread) 5.60 26.09 0.76 7.63
mean(B/y) −43.36 −22.48 −21.22 −7.23
std(y) 8.12 5.52 5.63 5.71
std(C) 9.47 6.57 6.35 6.38
std(TB/y) 1.75 1.75 1.49 1.75
corr(c, y) 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96
corr(TB, y) −0.59 −0.47 −0.36 −0.24
corr(spread, y) −0.89 −0.55 −0.50 −0.67
corr(spread, c) −0.91 −0.70 −0.64 −0.73
corr(spread, TB/y) 0.70 0.85 0.83 0.47
0.00
prob(default) 3.00 3.03 0.11 3.07
drop in y upon default −14.21 −13.28 −15.41 −13.02
drop in c upon default −16.01 −12.77 −15.02 −12.84
welfare 1.000 1.008 1.013
welfare with mean y, zero b 1.000 1.007 1.011
discount factor β 0.97 0.97 0.93
output loss λ 0.10 0.10 0.10
re-entry probability θ 0.10 0.10 0.65
Note: The first column shows statistics for Argentina from 1983 to 2001. The income and consumption drops in
default are based on the 2001 Argentine default episode. The interest rate spread is computed as the difference of
the EMBI yield and the yield of a 5 year U.S. bond. The second column presents the statistics in the model with
decentralized borrowing. The third column presents the statistics in the model with centralized borrowing under
the same set of parameter values as in the decentralized borrowing model. The last column presents the statistics
in the centralized borrowing model recalibrated to best match the data. All statistics except correlations and
welfare are in percentage terms. The welfare results are calculated in terms of permanent consumption, and
then normalized by the welfare level in the decentralized borrowing model for ease of comparison.
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ratio than the centralized borrowing model does. The mean debt to income ratio is
22.48% in the decentralized borrowing model, while it is 21.22% in the centralized
borrowing model.
To understand these differences, we examine borrowing decisions in the two mod-
els. Figure 3 plots the desired borrowing conditional on not defaulting over the current
bond holdings.18 Desired borrowing is similar across the two models for low levels
of debt. As the debt level increases, desired borrowing increases faster under decen-
tralized borrowing. Under centralized borrowing, the government recognizes that the
interest rate increases as an additional unit of debt is taken. Under decentralized
borrowing, however, households do not take into account the interest rate effect of
their borrowing and would like to overborrow. This negative externality becomes
especially severe when current debt is large and the interest rate rises sharply with
an additional unit of debt.
Figure 3: Comparison of Desired Borrowing














Borrowing and default are two instruments with which households affect their
consumption path. Under centralized borrowing, the government, or equivalently the
representative household, owns both instruments. Under decentralized borrowing, the
18All figures in this subsection are based on the income shock, which is 10% below the mean. We
observe the same qualitative results for the other income shocks. Both the current and next-period
bond holdings are normalized by the mean income shock.
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households have only the first instrument and tend to take more debt since they fail
to internalize the negative externality of their borrowing. Thus, welfare, especially
the repayment welfare, is lower under decentralized borrowing, as shown in Figure 4.
Consequently, the government finds default attractive for a wider range of debt levels
under decentralized borrowing.
Figure 4: Comparison of Value Functions
























































The failure of individual households to internalize the effect of their borrowing on
the government’s default choices lowers the bond price schedule under decentralized
borrowing. As shown in the left panel of Figure 5, the prices are discounted by more
for any level of bonds under decentralized borrowing. This less favorable bond price
schedule generates tighter debt limits and constrains borrowing by more. The right
panel displays the total resources that debt generates, q(B′, y)B′. Any debt B′ less
than the safe debt limit B
′
generates resources B′/(1 + r). Once it exceeds the safe
debt limit, the debt becomes risky. Let us refer to the debt level which maximizes the
resource obtained from foreign lenders, q(B′, y)B′, as the risky debt limit, denoted
by B′. The optimal level of debt would never exceed the risky debt limit because
the borrower can obtain the same amount of resources with a smaller next-period
repayment. As shown in the figure, both the safe and risky debt limits are tighter
under decentralized borrowing.
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Figure 5: Comparison of Bond Price Schedules




















(a) Bond Price Schedule



























(b) Total Resource Borrowed
The incentive to overborrow and the lower bond price schedule have opposite
effects on the equilibrium level of debt. Whether decentralized borrowing leads to
larger equilibrium debt depends on which force dominates. Under the benchmark
calibration, desired borrowing is higher even when the bond price schedule is less
favorable under decentralized borrowing. This leads to higher equilibrium debt under
decentralized borrowing. Figure 6 shows the limiting distribution of bond holdings as
shares of mean income for the two models. The distribution is more concentrated on
high debt levels in the decentralized borrowing model. This implies that even with
higher costs of borrowing, the incentive to overborrow is strong enough to induce the
households to issue more debt. As a result, the interest rate spread is substantially
higher under decentralized borrowing. Also, the interest rate spread is more coun-
tercyclical under decentralized borrowing. As shown in Table 1, corr(spread, y) and
corr(spread, c) are −0.55 and −0.70, respectively, under decentralized borrowing, and
−0.50 and −0.64, respectively, under centralized borrowing.
Table 1 reports two sets of welfare statistics for each simulated model, first based
on the limiting distribution and second holding debt and income constant at zero
debt and at the mean income level across economies. The welfare is 1% lower under
decentralized borrowing than under centralized borrowing. The 1% welfare difference
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Figure 6: Comparison of Bond Distributions






































is economically significant, considering that the welfare cost of business cycles esti-
mated by Lucas (1987) is only about one-tenth of a percent of consumption. This
welfare implication holds even when we compare the two models for any given level of
the income shock and the debt-to-income ratio. The magnitudes of welfare differences
vary from 0.6% to 1.2%.
In summary, the decentralized borrowing model generates a larger default rate, a
higher mean spread, lower welfare and larger equilibrium debt than the centralized
borrowing model in the benchmark calibration.19 All these findings, except the one on
equilibrium debt, are robust to different default penalty parameters and specifications.
We will focus on the effects of decentralized borrowing on equilibrium debt levels in
section 1.4.
19Models with political economy can also generate interest rate spreads higher than the standard
sovereign debt model (see Cuadra and Sapriza (2008)). Political instabilities lead to short-sighted
governments, who do not fully internalize the next-period marginal cost of their borrowing and have
large incentives to default. Thus, everything else equal, interest rate spreads are higher than the
one without political instabilities. By contrast, our model generates higher interest rate spreads
because households do not fully internalize the current-period marginal benefit of their borrowing.
They ignore the impact of an additional unit of debt on economy-wide borrowing costs and tend to
overborrow, which increases default incentives of the government and interest rate spreads charged
by international creditors.
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1.3.3 Quantitative Predictions of the Models
In this subsection, we compare the quantitative predictions of the two models with
the Argentine data. Both models are calibrated to match the relevant moments in
the data. In particular, the parameters β, λ, and θ are calibrated to best match the
default rate, income loss, and trade-balance volatility in the data. The fourth column
of Table 1 shows the statistics of the recalibrated centralized borrowing model. To
generate the data moments, the centralized borrowing model needs a low discount
factor of 0.93, and a large reentry probability of 0.65. That is, the average exclusion
period after default is only 1.5 quarters.
The most striking difference across these two models is the equilibrium debt level.
The debt to income ratio is 7.23% in the model with centralized borrowing. In
contrast, it is about 22.48% in the model with decentralized borrowing—much closer
to the data. We want to highlight that these quantitative results depend critically
on the form and the parameter values of the default penalties, which we will analyze
in details in the next section. Given the importance of the default penalties, the
literature will benefit from more empirical research on the default penalties.
The model with decentralized borrowing also shows better performance in terms
of replicating countercyclical trade balances. The correlation between the trade bal-
ance and income is −0.59 in the data; it is only −0.24 in the model with centralized
borrowing, but −0.47 in the model with decentralized borrowing. In addition, de-
centralized borrowing generates a mean spread close to the data of 10.31%. The
mean spread is 11.25% in the decentralized borrowing model and only 7.30% in the
centralized borrowing model. On the other hand, the decentralized borrowing model
overestimates the volatility of the interest spread.
Although both models match well the output drop after default in the Argentine
2001 default episode, they predict a much stronger negative relationship between
output and default than is found in the historical record. As documented by Tomz
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and Wright (2007), the output declines from trend by only 1.6% in the first year of
default in 169 default episodes over the period 1820–2004. Moreover, they document
that only 62% of all the default episodes occur when the output is below the trend.
However, the output declines from the trend in the first year of default by 12% under
decentralized borrowing and by 11% under centralized borrowing. In both models,
almost all default episodes occur when the output is below the trend.20
One caveat of the model simulation is worth mentioning. We compute model
statistics based on 74 simulation periods before default to mimic the 74 quarters
between the two default events of Argentina. Ideally, we should compute statistics
based on the simulations where two consecutive defaults are exactly 74 periods apart.
However, it is rare to find such cases in the simulation. Instead, we compute the
model statistics based on the simulation episodes in which default ends and starts
70–78 periods apart, and compare these statistics with the benchmark results in
Table 4 in the appendix.21 Although some statistics are moderately different from
the benchmark, the key patterns between the centralized and decentralized borrowing
models are robust to this restricted sample of the model simulations.
1.4 Overborrowing or Underborrowing
This section examines the quantitative effect of decentralized borrowing on equilib-
rium levels of debt for different default penalties. We find that decentralized borrow-
ing generates larger levels of equilibrium debt than centralized borrowing only when
the default penalties are asymmetric and lenient. The decentralized borrowing model
generates low debt levels under symmetric default penalties or under asymmetric
harsh default penalties.
20A lower direct output cost parameter would reduce the discrepancy between the model simulation
and the data in these dimensions in both models. However, the models would have difficulties
matching the observed frequency of default and the observed debt to output ratio.
21There are about 13 such episodes in a simulation of 500,000 periods.
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1.4.1 Alternative Default Penalty Parameters
Consider the two models with the benchmark parameter values. In the first set of
experiments, we vary the default income loss parameter λ from 1% to 20% while
fixing all the other parameters. In the second set of experiments, we vary the re-
entry probability from 1% to 40% while fixing all the other parameters. We plot the
equilibrium debt to income ratios of the two models for these two sets of experiments
in Figure 7. First of all, equilibrium debt in both models increases with the default
income loss λ and decreases with the re-entry probability θ. This is intuitive because
larger values of λ or lower values of θ are associated with more severe default penalties,
and this in turn implies less frequent default and more lenient bond price schedules.
Figure 7: Equilibrium Debt: Varying Default Penalties















(a) Default Income Loss λ















(b) Re-entry Probability θ
Second, we find that decentralized borrowing generates overborrowing for low val-
ues of λ, but underborrowing for high values of λ, as shown in the left panel of Figure
7. The differences in equilibrium debt appear to be small in the figure, but the magni-
tudes of overborrowing or underborrowing are not trivial. For example, decentralized
borrowing generates overborrowing by 24.3% when λ is 0.02 and underborrowing by
1.2% when λ is 0.14. Note that for λ higher than 0.18, no default happens and thus
the equilibrium debt levels are identical in both models.
As we discussed earlier, decentralized borrowing has two counteracting effects on
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equilibrium debt: the overborrowing and bond price schedule effects. The overbor-
rowing incentive arises from the failure of individual households to internalize the
effect of their additional borrowing on the bond price. The more sensitive credit
costs are to aggregate borrowing, the stronger is the overborrowing effect, which can
be seen from comparing the first order conditions in equation (9) and (10). On the
other hand, the bond price schedule effect occurs because the overborrowing incentive
lowers the repayment welfare and drives up the default likelihood of the government.
Thus, the greater the decrease in the repayment welfare is, the stronger is the bond
price schedule effect.
When λ is low, the bond price schedules in both models are very sensitive to
aggregate risky borrowing because the government’s incentive to default rises rapidly
with additional units of debt. In addition, the difference between the two bond
price schedules is small, as shown in the left panel of Figure 8. This is because
decentralized borrowing, though it produces more defaults, lowers the repayment
welfare only by a little because default is not that costly. Thus, the overborrowing
effect is strong while the bond price schedule effect is weak, which leads to equilibrium
overborrowing. As λ increases, the bond price schedules in both models become flatter
and the difference between them becomes larger, as shown in the right panel of Figure
8. With increasingly severe default penalties, the government’s incentive to default
does not rise quickly as aggregate debt rises. But decentralized borrowing reduces the
repayment welfare substantially, which drives up the default incentives and lowers the
bond price schedule greatly. Thus, the overborrowing effect is weak while the bond
price schedule effect is strong, which leads to equilibrium underborrowing.
Finally, we compare equilibrium debt of the two models for different re-entry
probabilities θ. Decentralized borrowing generates overborrowing when θ is high, but
underborrowing when θ is low. In particular, equilibrium debt under decentralized
borrowing is 53.1% more when θ is 0.3, but 5.3% less when θ is 0.05. The equilibrium
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Figure 8: Bond Prices for Different Income Losses




















(a) Low Income Loss (λ = 0.04)




















(b) High Income Loss (λ = 0.14)
debt levels are identical across the two models for very low values of θ, which implies
no default in equilibrium. The intuition for these results is similar to that for different
λ. When θ is high, the bond price schedules are steep and similar in both models,
which leads to equilibrium overborrowing. When θ is low, the bond price schedules
become flatter and the difference between them becomes larger, implying equilibrium
underborrowing.
When the default rates are zero in both models, the two models generate identi-
cal business cycle statistics including the mean spread, default rate and welfare. In
all the other cases, the model with decentralized borrowing generates larger default
rates, higher mean spreads, and lower welfare than the model with centralized bor-
rowing. Even when decentralized borrowing generates equilibrium underborrowing,
the substantial difference in the bond price schedule, as shown in the right panel of
figure 8, is enough to make the spreads higher in equilibrium. We report the detailed
statistics for these experiments in Appendix B.
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1.4.2 Alternative Default Penalty Specification
We now investigate the symmetric default penalty of the following form:
ydef = (1− η)y, for all y, (12)
where η captures the constant fraction of income loss after default. Figure 9 shows
equilibrium debt levels for different values of η and θ. Surprisingly, under the symmet-
ric default penalty, decentralized borrowing consistently generates underborrowing.
Figure 9: Equilibrium Debt under Symmetric Default Penalty

















(a) Default Income Loss η

















(b) Re-entry Probability θ
To understand this result, we plot the bond price schedules for both models under
the symmetric default penalty in the left panel of Figure 10. In the right panel, we
plot the resources obtained from foreign lenders, q(B′, y)B′, as a function of next-
period debt. The bond price schedules are extremely steep and the risky-debt region
[B′, B
′
] is tiny in both models. For the overborrowing effect to operate, the risky debt
region needs to be large to accommodate the overborrowing incentives. Given the tiny
risky debt region, equilibrium debt is mainly constrained by the safe debt limits in
both models. Under decentralized borrowing, the overborrowing incentives tighten
the safe debt limit greatly, and this translates into underborrowing in equilibrium.
As in the case with the asymmetric default penalty, the model with decentralized
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Figure 10: Bond Prices Under Symmetric Default Penalty




















(a) Bond Price Schedule





























(b) Total Resource Borrowed
borrowing generates a higher default probability, a higher mean spread, and lower
welfare for all the cases with positive default rates. We report the detailed statistics
for different values of parameters in the symmetric default penalty case in Appendix
B.
1.5 Conclusion
Private debt inflows to developing countries have risen substantially in the past two
decades. Given the central role of developing countries’ governments in foreign debt
repayments, private foreign debt is often priced with macroeconomic indicators in-
stead of individual borrowers’ ability to repay. In such an environment, a pecuniary
externality arises from decentralized borrowing because private agents do not inter-
nalize the negative impact of their borrowing on aggregate credit costs. It has been
widely argued that this pecuniary externality caused excessive borrowing and fre-
quent debt crisis in developing countries. This paper evaluated quantitatively the
pecuniary effect of decentralized borrowing in a model where individual households
make borrowing decisions and a government makes default decisions to maximize the
welfare of the representative household.
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Despite the overborrowing incentives, the model with decentralized borrowing
generates a lower level of equilibrium debt than the model with centralized borrow-
ing for a wide range of paramter values. This is because households also face a less
favorable bond price schedule under decentralized borrowing, which tends to reduce
the optimal level of debt. When the income loss is proportional to the income shock,
decentralized borrowing always generates a lower equilibrium debt level regardless of
the parameter values for default penalties. When the income loss after default is dis-
proportionately large under good income shocks, decentralized borrowing generates
underborrowing for severe default penalties, but overborrowing for lenient default
penalties. On the other hand, decentralized borrowing unambiguously drives up the
economy-wide credit costs, raises the likelihood of sovereign default, and lowers wel-
fare.
Given our analysis on decentralized borrowing, regulations on private international
capital flows may improve welfare. The most obvious policy would be imposing cap-
ital controls to prohibit private borrowing. This would require that the government
be able to efficiently allocate funds among private agents. Alternatively, the govern-
ment can impose, on international private borrowing, either taxes if default is not
that costly or subsidies if default is costly.22 Future research on the optimal tax or
subsidy on international private borrowing will be useful since in practice it is hard
to implement capital controls.
22For discussions of optimal policy under complete markets, see Jeske (2006), Kehoe and Perri
(2004) and Wright (2006).
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Appendix A – Computational Algorithm
This appendix describes the computation algorithm for the decentralized borrowing
model in details. We first discretize the state space (b, y, B′). We next make initial
guesses for the bond price schedule and the government default decision. Specifi-
cally, we assume that q0(B′, y) = 1
1+r
for all (B′, y) and d0(B, y) = 0 for all (B, y).
Given these guesses, we solve the individual household’s optimal debt level b′(b, y, B′),
together with the law of motion of aggregate debt B′ = Γ(B, y). Specifically, we ac-
complish this using the following steps.
We guess an initial law of motion of aggregate debt Γ0(B, y). We then solve for
the optimal value functions vR and vD and the optimal debt policy b′ using value
function iteration for all combinations of (b, y;B′). We update the law of motion of
aggregate debt Γ1(B, y) such that b′(b, y, B′) = B′. We iterate these procedures until
Γ(B, y) converges. If there exist more than one fixed point, we take the B′ that gives
the smallest debt.
We then update the default decision d1(B, y) by solving the government’s problem
in equation (1). Accordingly, we update the bond price schedule. In order to minimize
spurious movements in the bond price, we interpolate the bond price schedule. To
do so, we first interpolate the value functions vR and vD over the income shock y.
We next find an income level ŷ(B) at which vR(B, ŷ(B), B′) = vD(ŷ(B)) for each
B. Note that ŷ(B) is not restricted to the discrete shock levels. We then update
q1(B′, y) = (1 −
∫ ŷ(B)
−∞ f(y
′|y)dy′)/(1 + r). We iterate over the bond price schedule
until it converges.
Two computational issues are worth mentioning. First, we use the discrete state-
space technique with 30 endowment grid points and 1600 asset grid points. Hatchondo
et al. (2010) show that the discrete state-space technique is likely to introduce spurious
interest rate movements if the grid points of the state space is too coarse. Given
the complexity of our model, we assume that the Markov endowment process is
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exogenously given by a 30-state Markov chain, obtained using a quadrature based
method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991).23 To check whether our asset grids are fine
enough to offer robust results, we increase the number of asset grids to 2000 and find
that the results remain almost unchanged.
Second, the fixed point mapping for the aggregate borrowing function has more
than one fixed point. The existence of the fixed point in the aggregate borrowing
function is straightforward to establish. Consider an aggregate borrowing function
which specifies aggregate borrowing for all (B, y) to be so large that the government
will default for sure next period. The bond price for such borrowing is zero, and
the individual household is indifferent between all levels of debt. Without loss of
generality, we can set individual borrowing the same as aggregate borrowing. Thus,
we have established the existence of the fixed point, though this particular fixed point
is not interesting because there is no borrowing and lending in equilibrium.
To find an “interesting” fixed point, we need to start with the initial guess for
the bond price to be the inverse of the risk free rate instead of zero. To illustrate
the fixed point mapping, we have plotted the debt choice of households b′(B, y;B′)
over aggregate debt choices B′ for different levels of aggregate debt and income (B, y)
in Figure 11. The equilibrium debt choice b′∗ is given by the intersection of the
function b′ and the 45-degree line. In general, as aggregate borrowing increases, the
bond price declines and individual borrowing decreases. When aggregate debt is
large enough such that the bond price is zero, households are indifferent between all
debt levels. Thus, the individual debt choice becomes a correspondence instead of a
function for this region of B′, which produces a continuum of fixed points. In the
case where q(B′, y) equals zero, we can set individual borrowing b′ to zero without
loss of generality, which implies a unique “interesting” fixed point. Or equivalently,
23The range of our discretized endowment shocks is larger than the range of the Argentina output
process. In addition, the simulated income series from our discrete shock process captures pretty
well various moments of the data.
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we can select the fixed point with smallest debt.
Figure 11: Fixed Point Mapping




























































The computation algorithm for the model with centralized borrowing is simpler.
We discretize the state space (B, y). We start with a guess for the bond price schedule,
q0C(B
′, y) = 1
1+r
for all (B′, y). We next solve the optimal value functions WR, WD
and the optimal policy function B′ using value function iteration. We then update
the default decision based on WR and WD. We finally update the bond price schedule
using a smoothing method analogous to that described above. We repeat the above
procedures until the bond price schedule converges.
Our computation strategy is different from Hatchondo et al. (2010) in solving the
optimal debt decision. Like most studies in the literature, we use the grid search
method over the discretized space. By contrast, Hatchondo et al. (2010) interpolate
the value functions over the asset space and use the first-order condition to solve for
the optimal debt decision. Hatchondo et al. (2010) show that when the number of the
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grid points are large enough, the two methods give very similar solutions. On the other
hand, both their and our papers smooth the bond price function by interpolating the
value functions over endowment and finding the cutoff endowment level that makes
the government indifferent between repaying and defaulting. To see the effect of the
bond price interpolation, Figure 12 shows the bond price schedule before and after
the interpolation for the model with centralized borrowing. The discrete state-space
(DSS) technique causes discrete jumps in the bond price, while the interpolation
method removes spurious movements in the bond price. Simulation results show that
the interpolation greatly reduces the volatility and countercyclicality of the interest
rate spread. Also, it reduces the default rate substantially, which suggests that the
DSS method might overestimate the default likelihood.
Figure 12: Bond Price Schedule with and without Interpolation




















Note: The displayed bond price schedules are for the median income shock.
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Appendix B – Sensitivity Analysis on Default Penalties
In this appendix, we report the simulation results for different default penalties. Ta-
ble 2 contrasts the relevant statistics of the two models for different parameter values
of the asymmetric default penalty specification. The decentralized borrowing model
generates overborrowing when default penalties are lenient (low λ and high θ), and
underborrowing when default penalties are severe (high λ and low θ). Moreover,
regardless of default penalties, the decentralized borrowing model generates substan-
tially higher mean spreads, larger default rates and lower welfare than the centralized
borrowing model.
Table 2: Varying Default Penalties: Asymmetric Income Loss
λ θ
0.06 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35
Decentralized
mean(B/y) −12.73 −23.41 −27.86 −32.02 −30.69 −16.45 −10.57 −7.82
mean(spread) 10.34 11.42 11.30 7.62 9.17 11.15 10.55 10.54
prob(default) 3.37 3.10 2.67 0.95 2.17 3.41 3.37 3.52
welfare 9.90 9.86 9.82 9.79 9.81 9.88 9.91 9.88
Centralized
mean(B/y) −10.99 −22.25 −27.69 −32.20 −32.32 −12.88 −7.10 −4.88
mean(spread) 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.07 0.03 0.56 0.90 1.19
prob(default) 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.30 0.36
welfare 9.95 9.92 9.91 9.90 9.91 9.93 9.94 9.95
Table 3 shows the results for different parameter values of the symmetric default
penalty specification. Different from the case with the asymmetric default penalty,
the decentralized borrowing model consistently generates lower equilibrium debt in-
dependent of the default penalty parameter values. Similar as in the asymmetric
default penalty case, decentralized borrowing generates higher mean spreads, higher
default rates, and lower welfare.
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Appendix C – Sensitivity on Restricted Simulation Samples
This appendix conducts sensitivity analysis on restricted simulation samples. Specif-
ically, we compute the model statistics based on the simulation episodes in which
default ends and starts 70–78 periods apart. The results are reported in Table 4
below. By contrast, the benchmark model statistics are computed on the 74 peri-
ods that are followed by default. The key difference is that the restricted simulation
episodes start with zero debt, while the benchmark simulations do not necessarily
start with zero debt. In the model with decentralized borrowing, the restricted sam-
ple produces a larger mean spread (12.20% versus 11.25%) and a lower debt to output
ratio (19.34% versus 22.48%). Similarly, in the recalibrated model with centralized
borrowing, the restricted sample produces a larger mean spread (8.96% versus 7.30%)
and a lower debt to output ratio (4.87% versus 7.23%). On the other hand, the key
patterns between the centralized and decentralized borrowing models are unchanged
in the restricted simulation sample.
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Table 3: Varying Default Penalties: Symmetric Income Loss
η θ
0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.35
Decentralized
mean(B/y) −2.91 −5.92 −11.53 −16.59 −17.41 −11.53 −8.61 −4.45
mean(spread) 10.89 7.20 5.66 4.29 6.86 5.66 5.85 7.45
prob(default) 4.21 2.41 2.23 1.29 2.48 2.23 2.43 2.79
welfare 9.88 9.86 9.82 9.84 9.86 9.82 9.82 9.78
Centralized
mean(B/y) −3.99 −8.20 −17.00 −26.22 −30.25 −17.00 −11.74 −5.17
mean(spread) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
prob(default) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
welfare 9.96 9.96 9.94 9.92 9.92 9.94 9.95 10.01
Table 4: Defaults End/Start 70–78 Periods Apart
Statistics Data Model
Decentralized Centralized 2
mean(spread) 10.31 12.20 8.96
std(spread) 5.60 24.27 8.42
mean(B/y) −43.36 −19.34 −4.87
std(y) 8.12 5.59 5.90
std(C) 9.47 6.42 6.38
std(TB/y) 1.75 1.90 1.51
corr(c, y) 0.98 0.95 0.97
corr(TB, y) −0.59 −0.27 −0.19
corr(spread, y) −0.89 −0.51 −0.56
corr(spread, c) −0.91 −0.69 −0.62
corr(spread, TB/y) 0.70 0.79 0.46
drop in y upon default −14.21 −12.38 −12.23
drop in c upon default −16.01 −11.87 −12.05
discount factor β 0.97 0.93
output loss λ 0.10 0.10
re-entry probability θ 0.10 0.65
Number of episodes 118 105
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CHAPTER II
The Impact of Foreign Liabilities on Small Firms:
Firm-Level Evidence from the Korean Crisis
with Linda L. Tesar and Jing Zhang
2.1 Introduction
The sequence of events experienced by an emerging market undergoing a financial cri-
sis is now all-too-familiar. Rapid economic growth and financial market liberalization
encourage capital inflow, contributing to an overvalued exchange rate and increased
reliance on foreign credit, usually denominated in US dollars. As economic growth
and exports slow, the economy tips into crisis. The exchange rate collapses, capi-
tal flow reverses and firms find themselves unable to meet their debt requirements.
Firms, and in some cases governments, become insolvent. Those deemed “too big to
fail” may receive bailouts; others slash employment, declare bankruptcy or are sold
to foreign owners.
While the general anatomy of crises has been well-documented,24 the exact chan-
nels through which a financial crisis translates into a real economic contraction at the
microeconomic level are less well understood. Traditional macroeconomic models pre-
dict that a depreciation of the exchange rate will be expansionary by making exports
more competitive. However, if the depreciation occurs when firms are holding sig-
nificant foreign-currency denominated liabilities, a negative balance-sheet effect may
outweigh the export-expansion effect (Krugman 1999, Céspedes, Chang and Velasco
24See for example Corsetti et. al. (1999)
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2004, and Feldstein 1999). In general, the literature has found ample evidence of the
expansionary export effect but limited evidence of the balance-sheet effect.25 Due to
data limitations, most existing firm-level studies examine only publicly-listed firms
that survived the financial crisis, and leave the extensive margin of the balance sheet
effect unexplored.
In this paper, we use a detailed database on over 4000 Korean firms-both privately-
held and publicly-listed-to study the impact of the 1997-1998 Korean financial crisis
on firm performance. The database contains information on firms’ export status,
holdings of foreign debt, and total indebtedness along with a host of other firm-
level characteristics. The database also provides information about firm exit during
the crisis. We exploit the heterogeneity across firms to see which factors-firm size,
industry, export status, exposure to foreign debt, and term structure of debt-are
critical for explaining firm performance and firm exit leading up to and during the
Korean crisis.
Our analysis yields three key findings. First, we find evidence of a significantly
negative balance-sheet effect for small firms conditional on survival. Specifically, for a
firm at the 10th percentile of the size distribution (with size measured by real assets), a
one percent increase in its short-term foreign debt ratio prior to the crisis is associated
with a 0.31 percent lower rate of sales growth during the crisis. Most existing firm-
level studies focus on publicly-listed firms and often find either no positive balance
sheet effect or a positive balance sheet effect. The reason we are able to find evidence
of a significantly negative balance-sheet effect is because of the broad coverage of our
dataset, which includes both well-established, publicly-listed firms as well as small,
privately-held firms. This balance-sheet effect becomes insignificant when one focuses
only on publicly-listed firms as in previous studies. Publicly-listed firms tend to be
25Benavente et. al. (2003), Bleakley and Cowan (2008), Bonomo et.al. (2003), Forbes (2002),
and Luengnaruenitchai (2003) find either a positive balance sheet effect or no balance sheet effect.
In contrast, Aguiar (2005), Carranza et. al. (2003), Echeverrya et. al. (2003), Gilchrist and Sim
(2007) and Pratapa et.al. (2003) find some evidence of a negative balance sheet effect.
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larger, are more likely to be exporting firms and are more likely to survive the crisis
than an average Korean firm.
Second, we find strong evidence of the balance sheet effect on small firms at
the extensive margin: foreign debt holdings are a significant predicator for firm exit
during financial crisis. Consider a percentage point increase in the pre-crisis foreign
debt ratio for firms at varying sizes.26 The marginal impact on the probability of
exit increases from about zero for a firm of median size to 0.28 percentage points for
firms at the 10th percentile. Again, the impact of the crisis on firm exit is missed in
samples that focus on publicly-listed firms that survived the 1997-98 contraction. Our
dataset makes it possible to study firm exit during the Korean crisis, which accounts
for nearly 20 percent of the decline in aggregate sales in the peak year of the crisis.
Analysis of exit rates underscores the devastating impact of the crisis on small firms
that had foreign liabilities prior to the crisis.
Third, we find a strong export-expansion effect: exporters experience smaller de-
clines in sales growth during the crisis than non-exporters. While in principle exports
provide a natural hedge against the negative effects of an exchange rate depreciation,
many firms do not export and therefore do not benefit from this channel. Our data
suggests that about 70 percent of Korean firms that carried foreign currency debt on
their balance sheets at the time of the crisis were not engaged in exporting. Moreover,
for the smallest quartile of firms, 90 percent of firms with foreign debt holdings were
non-exporters. Therefore, a significant fraction of the population of Korean firms-
importantly, many small firms-entered the crisis with exposure to balance sheet risk
with no offsetting benefits of an improvement in global competitiveness.
Paradoxically, we find that large firms with more exposure to foreign debt expe-
rience smaller declines in sales growth during the crisis. Similar results have been
documented by many studies in the literature focusing on large and publicly-listed
26Specifically, the ratio of foreign debt holdings to liabilities is set at the mean level conditional
on having foreign debt, and all other characteristics are set at the sample mean.
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firms. We also find that large firms with more exposure to foreign debt are less likely
to exit during the crisis. The exact interpretation of these findings is unclear. We
suspect that omitted variable bias may be the reason behind these findings. Large
firms, like publicly-listed firms, are more likely to hedge exchange rate risk and have
access to other means of financing during the crisis. Omitted variable bias may be
less severe for small firms than for large firms, so we are able to find evidence of the
balance-sheet effect for small firms.
We perform counterfactual exercises to illustrate the importance of these various
channels (the balance-sheet effect and the export-expansion effect), taking into ac-
count both the contraction in sales as well as firm exit. These exercises demonstrate
the importance of firm heterogeneity in assessing the role of foreign debt in the cri-
sis.27 For large firms, an increase in the foreign debt ratio has very little impact, if
any, on firm performance. Similarly, the predicted exit rate changes very little as large
firms tend to be hedged through exports. For the bottom quarter of firms, however,
an across the board increase in foreign debt predicts a 1.6 percentage point decline in
total sales growth conditional on survival. Their predicted exit rate increases by 7.4
percentage points, and the overall predicted decline in sales growth-taking into ac-
count sales contraction and firm exit-is nearly 8 percentage points. About 80 percent
of the decline in sales growth is explained by firm exit for these small firms. What
these experiments suggest is that in assessing exposure to exchange rate risk, it is
important to know which firms are carrying foreign currency liabilities and whether
those firms are also exporting firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 briefly presents macroeconomic
dynamics of the Korean financial crisis. Section 2.2 describes the dataset. Section 2.3
focuses on the surviving firms and presents the evidence of the balance-sheet effect
from the cross-sectional regression analysis. Section 2.4 focuses on the exit margin
27In this counterfactual experiment, we increase firm leverage by ten percentage points and assume
that all of the increase is in short-term foreign debt.
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and documents the balance-sheet effect on firm exit during financial crisis. We also
conduct counterfactual experiments in this section. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Macroeconomic Dynamics of the Korean Financial Crisis
In the years preceding the Asian financial crisis, South Korea was one of the fastest
growing economies in the world, with sustained high growth rates for more than two
decades. Beginning in late 1997, the Korean economy entered a severe economic con-
traction. Some indicators of the magnitude of the crisis are illustrated in Figure 13a,
which shows real GDP, consumption, investment and total employment normalized
to their 1997 values.28 The declines were big: from peak to trough real GDP declined
7%, real consumption fell 14%, real investment fell 35%, and employment dropped
5%. During the crisis, the current account displayed a sudden reversal of over 15
percentage points, shifting from a negative balance of 4% of GDP to a positive 12%
of GDP (Figure 13b). While the crisis was deep, it was also mercifully brief. By 1999
real GDP and consumption returned to levels above their pre-crisis values.
During the boom years, Korean firms and households dramatically increased their
reliance on credit. Between 1995 and 1997, total private credit as a share of GDP
increased from 104 percent of GDP to almost 120 percent of GDP (see Figure 13d).
Much of the credit expansion took the form of borrowing from abroad. Figure 13c
shows that external debt peaked in 1997 at 60 percent of GDP, with over a third of
total borrowing with maturities of one year or less. The declines in both total private
credit and external debt as shares of GDP in 1997 to 2000 illustrate the dramatic
deleveraging that occurred in Korea in the aftermath of the crisis.
Figures 13e and 13f show the dynamics of two key prices: the nominal exchange
rate (Korean won relative to the US dollar) and the nominal interest rate (the monthly
money market rate). As shown in Figure 13e the nominal exchange rate depreciated
28The plot shows annualized data-the crisis hit in the fourth quarter of 1997.
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by almost 100% during the last weeks of 1997, peaking in January 1998. Thereafter,
the won fully floated against the dollar. It appears that there was significant over-
shooting of the Korean won-between late-1997 and mid-1998 the won appreciated
relative to the dollar although it did not return to its pre-crisis level. The short-term
interest rate (Figure 13f) also shot up during the crisis, increasing from its pre-crisis
range of 10-15 percent to a peak of 25.6 percent in January 1998.
The severity of the crisis has been attributed to high rates of leverage in the econ-
omy, particularly in the form of external debt, coupled with a sudden, unanticipated
(and therefore unhedged) exchange rate depreciation. Despite the large literature on
this topic, there has been little microeconomic evidence to support the connection
between financial variables and real economic activity. We next describe the firm-
level data that we will use to analyze the linkages between balance sheet risk and firm
performance.
2.3 Description of Firm-Level Data
We obtain firm-level data from the Korea Information Service, Inc. (KIS), a provider
of financial and corporate data for Korean firms. The underlying source of the data
is the annual financial statements of all Korean firms with assets over 7 billion won.29
The KIS removes liquidated firms from the dataset, and therefore the main dataset
contains only surviving firms. We obtained additional information on liquidated firms
from the KIS in a secondary database.30
The KIS data have several advantages over the data that have been employed in
earlier studies of financial crises in emerging markets.31 First, the KIS data include
29Firms with assets of 7 billion won or more are required by the Act on External Audit of Joint-
Stock Corporations to report audited financial statements to the Financial Supervisory Commission,
which is then compiled by the KIS. Some firms with assets less than 7 billion won voluntarily report
their financial statements and show up in the dataset.
30Data on liquidated firms were available by special request from the KIS.
31Examples, among many others, include Aguiar (2005), Bleakley and Cowan (2008), Borensztein
and Lee (2002), Forbes (2002), Gilchrist and Sim (2007), Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2009), and Martinez
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firms that are not listed on the Korean stock exchange. The KIS data reveal that
publicly-listed firms are only a fraction of the population of Korean firms and they
provide a skewed portrait of the impact of the crisis at the micro-level. The KIS
data also provide information on foreign currency denominated debt versus domestic
debt32 as well as the maturity structure of the debt. The database contains firm-level
information on whether a firm is an exporter or not, allowing us to disentangle the
export-expansion effect from the balance-sheet effect of an exchange rate depreciation.
Finally, the merged database allows us to study firm exit, a margin of adjustment
during the Korean crisis that has not heretofore been studied.
2.3.1 Characteristics of Surviving Firms
Table 5 provides summary statistics for surviving firms. We focus on the 1994-1999
sample period to capture the effects of the financial crisis. We exclude firms in the
financial sector. In order to limit the influence of outliers, we eliminate observations
in the top and bottom 1 percent of the sample in terms of the sales growth rate and
the profit rate. When firms are sorted by industry, about 62 percent of firms are in
the manufacturing sector, 14 percent in wholesale, retail trade and transportation,
11 percent in construction and utility, and another 13 percent provide other services.
These industry shares are fairly constant over the 1994-1999 period. The full sample
of firms, shown in line 1 of the top panel, starts with a sample size of 3,151 and
increases over the 1994-1999 period. The increase in the sample size over time is not
surprising given that the cutoff for coverage (7 billion won) is fixed in nominal terms;
as the economy grows and there is inflation, the number of firms above this cutoff
and Werner (2002). All these papers focus on publicly listed firms. Bleakley and Cowan (2008) have
no information on export status and Forbes (2002) uses total debt statistics instead of foreign debt.
All these papers, except Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2009), have no exit information. In Kalemli-Ozcan et
al (2009) firms rarely exit, so the extensive margin plays a limited role in their study.
32The KIS does not provide the currency denomination of foreign debt. However, other sources
indicate that the majority of foreign borrowing was denominated in US dollars. According to Kwon
(2005), prior to the crisis 96 percent of foreign debt of publicly-listed firms was in US dollars, 3
percent in yen, and 1 percent in other currencies.
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will obviously increase.
The mean age of firms (Table 5, line 2) is 15 to 17 years. In the first year, the
median level of total assets (line 4) is 20 billion won, about triple the cutoff level
for inclusion in the database. The mean level of real assets (line 3) is dramatically
larger at 112 billion won, suggesting that the full sample covers many smaller firms.
As we show below, inclusion of relatively small firms is critical for identifying the
balance-sheet effect on firm performance during the crisis.
The focus of our analysis will be firm performance during the crisis as measured
by sales growth rates.33 Annual real sales growth rates and profit rates are shown in
lines 5 and 6 of the top panel of Table 5. The median real sales growth rate is in
the 10-15 percent range in the pre-crisis period. The crisis occurred in late 1997, and
median real sales growth drops off to 6.7 percent that year and then plummets to
10.3 percent in 1998. The profit rate is defined as the ratio of the pre-tax profit and
the previous-year sales. The median profit rate is around 3 percent in the pre-crisis
years, and drops to 2 percent in 1997 and 2.3 percent in 1998.
Firm-level financial statistics are shown in lines 7 to 10. The leverage ratio (line
7) is defined as total liabilities over total assets. The short-term debt ratio (line 8)
is the share of short-term debt in total liabilities. The foreign debt ratio (line 9) is
computed as the ratio of foreign debt to total liabilities. The short-term foreign debt
ratio (line 10) is the share of short-term foreign debt in total liabilities. The mean
leverage ratio declines after the crisis from 76% in 1994-1997 to 67% in 1999. The
short-term debt ratio is relatively constant over the period of 1994-1999 at around
30%. The foreign debt ratio is about 4% before the crisis and rises to 6% in 1997
in part due to the exchange rate depreciation. The short-term foreign debt ratio is
about 1.7% before the crisis and rises to 2.2% in 1997. The number of firms with
foreign debt exposure (line 13) is large: about 40 percent of the full sample of firms
33We also studied alternative performance measures of the pre-tax profit/sales ratio and the in-
vestment/capital ratio. The results are generally similar and are reported in the appendix.
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carried foreign-currency denominated debt on their balance sheets in 1996. For those
firms reporting foreign liabilities, the average foreign debt ratio was 12 percent in
1996.
Figure 14 compares the level of foreign currency debt of the banking sector and
the sum of foreign currency debt of the firms in our sample. In both cases debt is
decomposed into short-term and long-term debt, where short-term debt is defined as
debt with original maturity of one year or less. External debt of both banks and
private firms in our sample increased in the years preceding the crisis, with short-
term debt accounting for roughly half of all external liabilities. This pattern is not
surprising because the majority of foreign debt holdings by Korean firms are channeled
through the domestic banking sector.
Previous analyses of emerging market crises suggest that exports may have pro-
vided firms with a natural hedge for foreign currency exposure–a depreciating cur-
rency will increase the cost of dollar–denominated debt service, but will increase the
firm’s competitiveness in foreign markets.34 Firm exports as a share of total sales are
reported in line 11 of the top panel of Table 5. The mean export to sales ratio is
around 6 percent in our sample period. The fraction of exporting firms (line 12) in
the full sample ranges from 13 to 20 percent. Conditional on exporting, the average
export to sales ratio is around 30 percent.
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports summary statistics for publicly-listed firms,
which ac-count for 20 to 25 percent of the full sample. Publicly-listed firms are older,
bigger and more profitable than an average firm in the full sample. They tend to
have a smaller decline in sales growth during the financial crisis. They have some-
what lower leverage ratios and short-term debt ratios. They are also more exposed
to foreign-currency denominated debt and are more likely to be exporters. Firms
holding foreign-currency denominated debt constitute about 64 percent of the sample
34See Aguiar (2005) for Mexico, Bleakley and Cowan (2008) for five Latin American countries,
and Luengnaruemitchai (2003) for six East Asian countries.
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of publicly-listed firms but only 39 percent of the full sample in 1996. The fraction of
firms that are exporters is about 27 percent among publicly-listed firms, while only 16
percent among the full sample in 1996. Conditional on having dollar debt, the mean
foreign debt ratio and the export-sales ratio are similar across these two samples.35
An important issue is the extent to which our sample of firms is representative of
the dynamics of the aggregate economy. While our empirical work will exploit het-
erogeneity between firms, our results could be viewed with suspicion if our sample of
firms exhibits aggregate sales behavior during the crisis that is dramatically different
from the dynamics of aggregate economic activity in Korea. To address this issue,
Figure 15a shows the sum of firm sales as a ratio of GDP. The top line is the sum of
all sample firms relative to GDP. The ratio is just under 1 in 1994 and increases to
about 1.4 in 2000 as more firms are brought into the sample.36 The figure also shows
the ratio for publicly-listed firms, which tops out at about 0.9. Figure 15b compares
the time series of real GDP growth over 1994-1999 to median real sales growth for
our full sample of firms. Not surprisingly, there is more variation in the sales growth,
but the shape of the two curves is similar. Both series pick up the dramatic fall in
economic activity in 1998 and the recovery in 1999. This suggests that the patterns
we see in firm-level data are consistent with aggregate macroeconomic dynamics.
35Another group of Korean firms that has received a great deal of attention is the subset of firms
belonging to chaebols. Chaebols are South Korean conglomerates composed of many companies
clustered around one parent company. As the literature has emphasized, membership in a chaebol
can provide insurance to firms through interlocking contracts and financial linkages. See Borensztein
and Lee (2002), Lee et. al. (2000), and Min (2007). Our dataset includes roughly 230 firms that are
part of the top 30 chaebols. Their characteristics tend to be similar to those of publicly-listed firms
with several exceptions. First, the size of a chaebol firm, as measured by mean real assets, is more
than twice the size of publicly-listed firms, and about seven times larger than the mean firm in the
full sample. Second, the chaebols tend to have larger sales growth rates but lower profit rates than
the publicly-listed firms. Third, the chaebols have much larger leverage ratios and greater exposure
to foreign debt than the publicly-listed firms. Finally, the chaebols have smaller export/sales ratios
than the publicly-listed firms. We include a chaebol dummy in our cross-section analysis to test for
the role of network linkages on firm performance. No chaebols exited from the sample prior to the
financial crisis.
36These numbers are smaller than the output/GDP ratio for the US economy. Based on BEA
data, the ratio of gross output of all industries excluding the financial industry to GDP ranges from
1.64 to 1.7 between 1994 and 2007. Thus, firm coverage of the KIS database might be somewhat
less complete than the BEA coverage.
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2.3.2 Characteristics of Liquidated Firms
We now turn to liquidated firms in the sample. The KIS database provides a list
of firms that submitted a notification of closing business to the court system and
balance sheet information for these firms before their liquidation.37 Table 6 provides
summary statistics of firms that exited during the 1994-99 period-line numbers are
identical to those in Table 5 for ease of comparison across the categories of firms. The
exit rate in our sample–shown at the top of the table–was around 2 percent in the
pre-crisis years, doubled to about 5 percent in 1997 and remained high at around 4
percent in 1998.38 The exit rate dropped to 1 percent in 1999. It should be noted
that no publicly-listed firms filed a notification of closing throughout the 1994-1999
period. No chaebol firms exited before the crisis, and some did exit during the crisis.
Comparing liquidated firms with all firms (recall Table 5 and note that the statis-
tics in Table 6 are for the year preceding firm exit), we see that liquidated firms
tend to be younger and much smaller in size than the average firm. Before they exit,
firm-level profit rates are very low and negative.39 Prior to exit, liquidated firms are
less likely to be exporters and carry substantially more debt, particularly short-term
debt, relative to the average firm. Liquidated firms are less likely to have foreign
debt, and have smaller foreign debt ratios than the average firm. They also tend to
be concentrated in the construction and manufacturing sectors.
In panel B of Table 6, we decompose the decline in annual aggregate firm sales
growth into the drop in sales of surviving firms (the intensive margin), and the drop
37The list of liquidated firms does not include reorganized firms or firms that were sold to a foreign
company. Thus, our exit data underestimates the severity of bankruptcy in crisis. The dataset does
not allow us to precisely track entry. Firms may appear in the database either because they are
newly established or because they reach the 7 billion won criterion.
38The exit rate in year t is computed as the number of firms that exited in year t divided by the
sum of the number of surviving firms from year t-1 to t and the number of firms that exited in year
t.
39For exiting firms, we have only after-tax profits instead of pre-tax profits. The profit rate for
exiting firms is thus computed using after-tax profits.
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due to firm exit (the extensive margin).40 Consider the change in total firm sales
between year t and year t+1. Some firms in year t continue in operation in year
t+1, and we refer to these firms as “surviving firms.” The remaining firms liquidate
and exit, and we refer to them as “exiting firms.”41 The aggregate net sales growth
equals the ratio of total sales of surviving firms in period t+1 and total sales of both
surviving and liquidated firms in period t minus 1. We decompose aggregate sales
growth into the intensive and extensive margin in the following way:
salessurvive,t+1
salessurvive,t + salesexit,t





where the left hand side is the aggregate net sales growth, the first term on the right
hand side is the intensive margin and the second term is the extensive margin. The
intensive margin is the ratio of the change in total sales of surviving firms between
year t+1 and t and total sales in period t, and the extensive margin is the ratio of
total sales of exiting firms and total sales of all firms in year t.
As the table shows, the contribution of the extensive margin to aggregate sales
growth is small prior to the crisis-about 3 percent of total sales growth in our sam-
ple. In the crisis years, however, the extensive margin becomes substantially more
important, accounting for 18 percent of the fall in aggregate sales growth in 1998.
2.4 Cross-sectional Analysis of Firm Performance
Before turning to the regression analysis, we first plot the time series of median
sales growth for different subgroups of firms. We restrict the sample to the firms
40In this analysis, we abstract from the entry margin because the KIS dataset does not cover many
entering firms. We doubt that the entry margin plays an important role during the financial crisis.
41In this analysis, we ignore the contribution to total sales growth by firms that newly enter the
database in period t+1.
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that report relevant statistics throughout 1994-1999. We classify firms into different
groups according to their characteristics in 1996. Figure 16 shows median sales growth
for firms by industry, firm size, export status, leverage, short-term debt and foreign
debt as a share of total liabilities. The overwhelming message of Figure 16 is that
the economic contraction was a macroeconomic phenomenon. While there are some
differences across firms–for example sales of non-exporters contracted more sharply
than exporters, and sales of the construction and utility industry had the deepest
fall in 1998–virtually all sectors and all types of firms experienced a deep contraction
in 1998 and a sharp recovery in 1999. This suggests that to the extent differences
in firm-level characteristics are important for understanding the crisis, they will only
explain a fraction of the overall variation, and will likely work through interaction
effects or through firm exit.
The general form for the cross-section regressions is shown in the following equa-
tion:42
SALES GROWTHi = α + βCHARi,−2 + εi. (14)
The dependent variable is firm i’s annual real sales growth. We perform the regression
analysis for two time periods-the crisis period (characteristics in 1996 as explanators
for the sales growth rate between 1997 and 1998) and the pre-crisis period (charac-
teristics in 1994 as explanators for the sales growth rate between 1995 and 1996).43
42Our goal is to account for the cross-sectional variation in firm performances during the crisis,
and to relate this variation to firm-specific pre-crisis characteristics. An alternative would be to use
a panel specification with firm fixed effects, and estimate how within-firm variation in debt holdings
and export sales affects variation in firm performances over time. In that case, the impact of the
crisis would be estimated through an interaction of lagged firm characteristics with the crisis dummy.
We do not pursue this strategy for three reasons. First, such a specification would answer a different,
much more narrow question: how does the crisis affect the relationship between debt holdings or
export sales and sales growth within a firm? Second, firm fixed effects soak up explanatory power
of interesting and informative time-invariant firm characteristics. Third, the short-time dimension
of our dataset implies that we have limited variation to exploit.
43We repeat the analysis with alternative measures of firm performance: the profit rate and the
investment rate. The results are reported in the appendix. The main findings are broadly similar to
those we report for sales growth. To ease exposition, we will focus primarily on the results for sales
growth.
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In the baseline specification, firm-level characteristics include size (the log of firm
real assets), age, chaebol status, leverage ratio, short-term debt ratio, export/sales
ratio, and foreign debt ratio. All variables are in real Korean won. We include
a two-digit industry dummy to control for industry-specific effects. In the second
specification, we also include interaction effects between firm size with the foreign
debt ratio, the leverage ratio, and the short-term debt ratio to allow these variables’
effects on sales growth to differ by firm size. In the third specification, we decompose
the foreign debt ratio by maturity to examine whether firms with varying foreign debt
maturities have differential firm performance.
2.4.1 Cross-Section Results for Publicly-Listed Firms
Table 7 shows the results for the sample of publicly-listed firms-the firms that have
been carefully studied in previous analyses. Specifically, columns 1, 2 and 3 report
the results for the crisis period, and columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results for the
pre-crisis period. Our results confirm the results generally reported in the literature.
In the pre-crisis period, chaebol status is positively related to firm performance while
firm age is negatively related to firm performance. However, there is no significant
effect of leverage, exports or balance-sheet variables. The results for the crisis period
are somewhat different. Though the chaebol status continues to be positively related
to firm growth, the age effect disappears. More importantly, the export-sales ratio
now appears with a positive, statistically significant coefficient, confirming the export-
expansion effect found in previous studies.
In terms of the balance-sheet effect, the first specification, in which financial vari-
ables are not interacted with firm size, presents a puzzling result. The coefficients
on the leverage ratio and on the foreign debt ratio are significantly positive. This
seems to suggest that firms entering the crisis with higher leverage ratios or higher
foreign debt ratios had better performance during the crisis. The literature reports
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similar findings for publicly-listed firms (see Bleakley and Cowan 2009). When fi-
nancial variables are interacted with size (columns 2 and 3) the positive coefficient
disappears (the first clue that something different is going on for smaller firms) and
the coefficients on financial variables are no longer statistically significant. Thus, an
analysis based on publicly-listed firms would either suggest a positive role for foreign
debt (if the size effect were omitted) or no role for financial variables in explaining
firm performance.
The positive coefficient on the foreign debt ratio in column 1 might be suggestive
of potential omitted variable bias. If some firm characteristics that are positively
correlated with a firm’s ability to raise foreign debt and with its sales growth are
omitted from our regression, the estimated coefficient on the foreign debt ratio would
be biased upward. For example, publicly-listed firms with more foreign debt may
better hedge against exchange rate risk through holding financial derivatives or foreign
currency denominated assets. Their hedging decisions in turn might lead to smaller
declines in sales growth during an exchange rate depreciation. Another example is
that publicly-listed firms with more foreign debt may also have greater access to
other forms of credit in crisis, so they experience smaller declines in sales growth.
Our dataset does not include the information on holdings of financial derivatives and
foreign currency denominated assets and on accessibility to financing to control for
these potential sources of bias.44
2.4.2 Cross-Section Results for the Full Sample
Table 8 repeats the analysis for a balanced sample of firms that includes small,
privately-held firms. In the pre-crisis cross-section regression, we take the sample
of firms in 1994 and hold that sample fixed through 1996. For the crisis cross-section
regression, we take the sample of firms in 1996, holding the sample fixed through
44Korean firms are required to disclose information about financial derivatives by law only after
2000.
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1998. Note that this sample is about four times the size of the sample in Table 7.
This analysis will still miss the impact of firm exit, however, as we include only those
firms that survive for the three-year interval (1994-1996 in the pre-crisis regression
and 1996-1998 in the crisis regression).
Turning first to the pre-crisis regression results in the right panel of Table 8, we see
that the effects of chaebol status and age remain significant. Specifically, chaebols and
younger firms are associated with faster sales growth. Moreover, there is no evidence
of an export effect, similar to the results for publicly-listed firms in the pre-crisis
period. The first specification (column 4) yields no significant effect for leverage,
short-term debt or foreign debt ratios prior to the crisis. When these financial ratios
are interacted with firm size (columns 5 and 6), leverage has a significant effect that
varies with firm size. Higher leverage ratios are associated with faster sales growth
rates for small firms, but slower sales growth rates for large firms. On the other hand,
greater exposure to short-term debt is associated with slower sales growth rates,
though the effect of short-term debt is smaller and may be positive for larger firms.
Foreign debt ratios remain insignificant in the full sample of firms in the pre-crisis
years.
The results are dramatically different during the crisis (the left panel of Table
8). There is a robust relationship between exports and firm sales: the coefficient on
export status is positive and strongly significant across all three specifications. The
effect is also economically significant. A ten percent increase in the pre-crisis export
sales ratio is associated with an increase in sales growth of approximately 2 percent
during the crisis. This export-expansion effect is similar to what we find in the sample
of publicly-listed firms.
The main difference across the two samples of firms is the balance-sheet effect.
In contrast to the findings for publicly-listed firms, the full sample shows strong
evidence of a negative balance-sheet effect on small firms. Again, if the financial
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variables are not interacted with size, the specification in column 1 of Table 8 yields
a significantly positive coefficient on foreign debt. When we include interaction terms
between financial variables and firm size in column 2, the coefficient on foreign debt
ratios turns significantly negative and the coefficient on the interaction term between
foreign debt and size is significantly positive. Holding all the other variables constant,
a one-percent larger foreign debt ratio affects sales growth by (2.817+0.134*size)
percent, which monotonically increases with firm size. The impact is negative for
small firms, but positive for large firms. The critical size, below which the effect of
foreign debt is negative is 21.02 in terms of log real assets and corresponds to a firm at
about the bottom 2 percentile in the size distribution. Thus, for most firms, a higher
foreign debt ratio is associated with a higher sales growth rate during the crisis. The
negative balance-sheet effect shows up only for very small firms.
The negative balance sheet effect on small firms is more prominent through short-
term foreign debt. The coefficient on short-term foreign debt in column 3 is significant
and large: 4.6. There is again an interaction effect with size–for large firms in the
sample, the impact of short-term foreign debt is positive while for small firms the
effect is negative. In this case, the cut-off point is 23.7 in terms of log real assets
and corresponds to a firm at the 58th percentile in the size distribution. Thus, for
firms with assets below the 58th percentile, an increase in the short-term foreign
debt ratio is associated with a lower sales growth rate, all else equal. The effects are
economically significant. Consider a firm with assets at the 10th percentile (log real
asset of 22.1). A one percent increase in the short-term foreign debt ratio prior to
the crisis is associated with a 0.31 percent lower rate of sales growth during the crisis.
Note that the corresponding coefficients are similar for the sample of publicly-listed
firms but were not statistically significant.45
45We included a dummy for foreign ownership to test the hypothesis that firms controlled by
foreign owners have access to other credit channels and may have been buffered from the effects
of the Korean crisis (see, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan et. al. 2009). Foreign-owned firms did not
display different results from the full set of firms.
58
There are at least two possible explanations for why significant balance-sheet
effects emerge in the full sample but not in the smaller sample of publicly-listed
firms. One reason may be that the larger number of observations and the greater
variation in the full sample yields more explanatory power. The other reason may
be that omitted variable bias is more severe in the sample of publicly-listed firms
than the full sample. Our conjecture is that publicly-listed firms are more likely to
hedge exchange rate risk and have access to other means of financing during the crisis,
than other firms in the full sample. Our data does not provide enough information
for us to determine the precise reasons for the difference between the two samples,
but the results are suggestive that relying on publicly-listed firms will affect one’s
interpretation of the impact of the crisis at the micro level.
Omitted variable bias might also help understand our paradoxical finding for large
firms in the full sample. Large firms tend to be publicly-listed firms, or to have similar
characteristics as publicly-listed firms. We conjecture that the positive balance-sheet
effect for large firms is due to omitted variable bias, although the exact interpretation
of this finding is unclear. On the other hand, the possibility of potential upward bias
from omitted variables might strengthen our conclusion about the negative balance
sheet effect on small firms.
The cross-section results based on the full sample support the view that both
the export-expansion channel and the negative balance-sheet channel played a role
during the crisis, with a particular role for exposure to short-term foreign debt. An
interesting question is whether firms that were exposed to balance sheet risk were also
exporters, and therefore were at least partially hedged from the negative impact of the
exchange rate devaluation. Table 9 shows the decomposition of firms by export status
and foreign debt holdings. The table shows that the share of non-exporters among
firms that held foreign debt is 71 percent in the full sample and 66 percent in the
publicly-listed sample. (The breakdown is similar for short-term foreign debt.) Thus,
59
a significant fraction of firms that entered the crisis with foreign debt did not have
a natural hedge for their currency exposure. The ratio of “non-hedged” to “hedged”
firms-as measured by export status-is higher in the full sample than in the publicly-
listed firms: 2.4 (=71/29) versus 1.9 (=66/34). We find that the ratio decreases with
firm size; the ratio is above 8 (=89/11) for the smallest quartile and about 2 (=68/32)
for the largest quartile, indicating that small firms with foreign debt holdings were
more exposed to exchange rate risk.
2.5 Firm Exit During the Financial Crisis
The cross-section results pertain to firms that survived the crisis. We now perform an
analysis of the factors that predict a firm’s liquidation before and during the crisis.
We find that foreign debt holdings are a significant predictor of firm exit, in particular
for small firms, during the crisis. We then combine the intensive and extensive margin
to examine the differential impact of foreign debt on firm performance by firm size.
2.5.1 Predicting Firm Exit
We run the following nonlinear probability regression on the panel of both surviving
and exiting firms for the pre-crisis and crisis period:
P (EXITi = 1) = Φ(α + θCHARi,−1), (15)
where P denotes the probability, EXIT is an indicator function of firm liquidation,
and denotes the logistic function. In the crisis period, the dependent variable is 1
if the firm exited in 1997 or 1998, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are
firm-specific observations in 1996, to capture the pre-crisis characteristics of the firm.
In the pre-crisis period, the dependent variable is 1 if the firm exited in 1995 or
1996, and 0 otherwise. Firm characteristics on the right hand side are measured in
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1994. Firm characteristics include chaebol status, age, one-digit industry dummy,
size, export/sales ratios, profit/assets ratios, leverage ratios, short-term debt ratios,
and (short-term and long-term) foreign debt ratios. Comparing results before and
during the crisis shows whether the factors that are correlated with the likelihood of
firm exit during the crisis are different from those before the crisis.
The coefficients of the logit regressions are reported in Table 10. Turning first
to the pre-crisis period (columns 4, 5 and 6) we see that relative to surviving firms,
exiting firms tend to be younger and carry more debt, particularly short-term debt
in the year preceding liquidation. Lower profits as a share of total assets significantly
increase the probability of exit. Export status does not affect significantly the like-
lihood of exit. Turning next to the crisis period (columns 1, 2 and 3) we see weak
evidence that being a chaebol member decreases the likelihood of exit.46 Younger
firms continue to have larger exit probabilities. The role of profits is less important,
while leverage and short-term debt become much more important. For a nonchaebol
manufacturing firm with all characteristics at the mean level, the marginal effect of a
higher leverage ratio on the exit probability is six times larger during the crisis than
before the crisis. The marginal effect of a higher short-term debt ratio is four times
larger. The coefficient on the export sales ratio changes from positive in the pre-crisis
period to negative in the crisis period, though it is still not statistically significant.
We next focus on the impact of foreign debt on firm exit. Columns 1 and 4 present
a puzzling result that foreign debt does not significantly affect, if any it reduces, exit
probabilities both pre-crisis and during the crisis. When interacted with firm size
(columns 2, 3, 5 and 6), foreign debt has a significant effect, which varies with firm
size, on the exit probabilities, suggesting that small firms with foreign debt are more
likely to exit while large firms are less likely to exit. Although the coefficients on
46Note that in the pre-crisis period, no chaebol firms were liquidated, and therefore we cannot
compare across samples. Even during the crisis, chaebol firms tended to be restructured and absorbed
by other firms rather than undergo complete liquidation.
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the foreign debt ratios and the interaction terms are similar pre-crisis and during the
crisis, the marginal effects can be different. In a nonlinear model, the marginal effect
of independent variables depends on all the covariates in the model. Especially for
an interaction effect, not only the magnitude but also statistical significance varies
by observation.
To examine the marginal effect of foreign debt across the two periods, the lower
panel of Figure 17 plots the marginal effect of foreign debt on the exit probability (y-
axis) before and during the crisis for nonchaebol manufacturing firms with different
size. We fix foreign debt ratios at the mean level conditional on having positive
foreign debt and all the other variables at the mean level of the sample. The solid
line is the estimated marginal effect and the two dashed lines are the 95% confidence
intervals. The marginal effect of foreign debt is significantly positive for small firms
and significantly negative for large firms during the crisis. In contrast, the marginal
effect of foreign debt pre-crisis is not generally significant except for very large firms.
Thus, a larger foreign debt ratio raises exit probabilities of small firms only during
the crisis.
During the crisis, for firms below the 54th percentile of the size distribution, a
larger foreign debt ratio predicts a higher likelihood of exit, and for firms above, a
larger foreign debt ratio lowers the probability of exit. For example, for a firm with
size at the 10th percentile and all other variables at the mean level, an increase in
the pre-crisis foreign debt ratio of one percentage point is expected to increase the
probability of exit during the crisis by 0.28 percentage points. In contrast, if the
firm is in the top decile, a one-percentage point increase in the foreign debt ratio
is expected to decrease the probability of exit by 0.23 percentage points. Similar
findings hold for both the short-term and the long-term foreign debt ratios.
The likelihood of exit also differs by firm size and across the two sample periods.
The upper panel of Figure 17 plots the estimated likelihood of exit for the same set
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of firms as in the lower panel. Clearly, the predicted exit rates are higher across all
firm size during the crisis than before the crisis. A firm with size at 10th percentile
has a probability of exit at 7.3 percent, while a firm with size at 90th percentile has
a probability of exit at 4.7 percent during the crisis. In contrast, the predicted exit
rate before the crisis is only 3.5 percent for a firm with size at 10th percentile and 1.4
percent for a firm at 90th percentile.
2.5.2 Counterfactual exercise
The previous results suggest that there are important interaction effects between
firm size and foreign debt, and that these effects vary across both the extensive and
intensive margins. In addition, we find that the export sales are a natural hedge to
foreign currency debt during the crisis. In this subsection we perform counterfactual
exercises to illustrate the roles played by these various factors in accounting for the
drop in firm sales during the financial crisis.
We first consider a counterfactual scenario in which each firm in our sample in-
creases its pre-crisis leverage ratio by 10 percentage points and all of the additional
borrowing is in the form of short-term foreign debt. We hold all of the other pre-crisis
firm characteristics unchanged. The regression results of Column 3 of Table 8 is used
to calculate the counterfactual sales growth of each firm in this scenario, conditional
on survival. We then compute the average sales growth rate, weighted by 1997 sales,
for each asset quartile and for the economy as a whole. Column 1 of Table 11 reports
the predicted sales growth given firm characteristics as observed in 1996, and column
2 reports the predicted sales growth given the counterfactual foreign debt levels. The
results illustrate the range of the impact of foreign debt on sales by firm size. Larger
short-term foreign debt lowers the sales growth of small firms, but increases the sales
growth of large firms. Specifically, the first (smallest) quartile sees a decline in the
sales growth rate from 2.9% to 4.5%, while the fourth (largest) quartile sees an in-
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crease from 13.5% to 9%. The aggregate sales growth rate rises from 12.6% to 8.6%
because large firms dominate overall sales growth.
We next turn to the extensive margin using the logit results in column 3 of Table
10. Recall that larger short-term foreign debt ratios increase the exit probability of
small firms, but reduce the exit probability of large firms. The average probabili-
ties of exit for each asset quartile given the observed characteristics and given the
counterfactual short-term foreign debt ratios are reported in column 4 and 5 of Table
11, respectively. Increasing short-term foreign debt leads to a doubling of the exit
probability of firms in the smallest quartile from 7.2% to 14.6%, while it reduces the
exit probability of firms in the largest quartile from 6.2% to 4.5%. The overall exit
rate rises from 7% to 9.3% as the foreign debt holdings increase in the economy.
We now combine the extensive and intensive margins by computing the average
of the predicted sales growth rate conditional on survival and the sales growth rate
of 1 conditional on exit, weighted by the survival and exit probability, respectively.
See column 7 and 8 of Table 11. Incorporating both effects, we find that increasing
short-term foreign debt is associated with a decline in the sales growth rate by 7.6
percentage points for firms in the smallest quartile, but is associated with a rise of the
sales growth rate by 5.7 percentage points for firms in the largest quartile. This result
suggests that the impact of foreign debt depends critically on what types of firms take
on foreign debt. If foreign debt is concentrated in the balance sheets of large firms,
which have ways to hedge against the currency depreciation in the crisis, foreign debt
is not necessarily detrimental to firms’ performance. On the other hand, if foreign
debt is concentrated in the balance sheets of small firms, the decline in predicted
sales growth is large. Note also that the extensive margin explains the majority of
the decline of sales growth for most firms in the sample. For example, the extensive
margin accounts for 80 percent of the decline in sales for the smallest quartile and 73
percent for the second smallest quartile. These numbers underscore the importance
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of taking firm exit into account when evaluating the effects of the crisis.
We conduct the second counterfactual experiment on the potentially mitigating
role played by export sales during the crisis. In this scenario, we set all exporters’
export/sales ratio to zero, to essentially eliminate any of the natural hedging effect of
firm exports on sales growth. The predicted sales growth rates conditional on survival
are reported in column 3 of Table 11. From the cross-section regression results, we
know that higher export-sales ratios are associated with better firm performance.
Thus, it is not surprising that the counterfactual export sales ratios lead to lower
sales growth rates for all asset quartiles and especially in the largest asset quartile
where most of the exporting firms appear. Overall sales growth also declines from
12.6% to 14.6%. Since the export/sales ratio does not have a large role in explaining
exit probabilities, the extensive margin (reported in column 6 of Table 11) changes
little from column 4. This suggests that to the extent exports provided a natural
hedge for the exchange rate depreciation, they did so primarily for the largest firms
in the sample and they did not shield small firms from the risk of bankruptcy during
the crisis.
2.6 Conclusion
Using Korean firm-level data on both publicly-listed and privately-held firms and firm
exit data, this paper finds evidence of a balance-sheet effect and an export-expansion
effect. Before the crisis, firm sales growth was uncorrelated with foreign debt holdings
and export sales. During the crisis, however, small firms holding more foreign debt, in
particular, short-term foreign debt, experienced larger declines in sales growth. Firms
with higher export sales ratios have smaller declines in sales growth during crisis. In
addition, we find that small firms with short-term foreign debt are significantly more
likely to go bankrupt during the crisis. The extensive margin accounts for a large
fraction of small firms’ adjustment during the crisis.
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There are two caveats to these conclusions. The first is that the results in this
paper pertain primarily to differential firm performance in the cross-section. As
shown in Figure 16, most of the variation in the data is at the macro level. That
is, our results can only explain whether firms with more foreign debt holdings have
sharper declines in sales than firms with smaller holdings and we do not claim to
provide an explanation for the overall decline in firm sales. Second, the regression
analyses take firm characteristics (size, debt ratios, export status, etc.) as given
in explaining next period’s sales growth. Obviously, many firm characteristics are
themselves choice variables, and a complete model would endogenize the full menu of
firm characteristics, including firm debt, exposure to foreign currency risk and export
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Appendix D
In this appendix, we report the cross-section regression results for two alternative
measures of firm performance: the profit rate and the investment rate. We first
describe the results on the profit rate. In the crisis regressions, the dependent variable,
i.e., the profit rate, is pre-tax profits in 1998 as a share of sales in 1997. In the pre-
crisis regressions, the profit rate is pre-tax profits in 1996 as a share of sales in 1995.
The independent variables are the same as in the sales growth regressions. We run
the regressions for both the publicly-listed firms (Table 12) and the full sample (Table
13). The results on the balance sheet effect and the export expansionary effect are
very similar to the results with sales growth. Firms entering the crisis with larger
foreign debt ratios have higher profit rates during the crisis (see column 1 of both
tables). However, when interacting with firm size, the coefficients on the foreign debt
ratio becomes negative and the coefficients on the interaction term become positive.
Thus, the negative balance sheet effect shows up for small firms. This effect is not
statistically significant for publicly listed firms, but it is significant at the ten percent
level for the full sample and the short-term foreign debt ratio.
We then look at the results with firm performance measured by the investment
rate. The investment rate is the ratio of real investment to the lagged replacement
value of real capital stock. In the crisis regression, the dependent variable is firm
real investment in 1998 as a share of the re-placement value of real capital stock in
1997. In the pre-crisis regression, the dependent variable is firm real investment in
1996 as a share of the replacement value of real capital in 1995. The independent
variables include all the characteristics that we examined for the sales growth rate
and the profit rate. In addition, we also include the lagged dependent variable as an
additional regressor to pick up the persistence effect of investment.
Before introducing the results, we explain the construction of the investment rate
in more details. For real investment (It), nominal investment is first constructed
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by Int = K
b
t − Kbt−1 + Dept, where Kbt is calculated by subtracting land and lease
assets from tangible assets (all in book values from the balance sheets), and Dept is
taken from the cash flow statements. Real investment is nominal investment deflated
by capital goods price index. The replacement value of real capital stock (Kt) is
calculated by iterating Kt = (1 − d)Kt−1 + It backward, where It is real investment
constructed as above and the economic depreciation rate d is assumed to be 11%,
which is an average depreciation of building, structure, vehicle and machine in South
Korea. The initial capital stock is measured as the real book value of capital in the
year that a firm first appears the data set.47
We report the results for the publicly-listed firms in Table 14, and the results for
the full sample in Table 15. For the publicly-listed firms, the balance sheet effect
and the export expansionary effect do not show up significantly in all specifications
during the crisis and before the crisis. For the full sample, we find evidence for both
effects. Larger export sales ratios are statistically significantly associated with higher
investment rates only during the crisis. Small firms with larger foreign debt ratios
have lower investment rates both during the crisis and before the crisis. The maturity
structure of foreign debt holdings does not matter for the investment rate during the
crisis. Before the crisis, small firms with larger long-term foreign debt ratios have
lower investment rates.
47We follow Bayraktar et. al. (2005) in constructing the investment rate.
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Figure 13: Aggregate Data
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Note: The data source is Korea National Statistical Office.
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Figure 14: Aggregate and Firm-Level Debt Data
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Note: Short-term debt has original maturity equal to or less than one year. The aggregate debt statistics come from Korea Na-
tional Statistical Office, and the firm-level debt statistics come from the KIS-VALUE dataset. 
 
 
Note: Short-term debt has original maturity equal to or less than one year. The aggregate debt
statistics co e from Korea N ional Statistical Office, and the firm-level debt statistics come from
the KIS-VALUE dataset.
Figure 15: Comparison of Firm Sales and GDP
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(a) Sum of Firm Sales / GDP
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(b) Real GDP and Firm Sales Growth (%)
Note: The data sources are Korea National Statistical Office and the KIS-VALUE dataset.
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Figure 16: Sales Growth of Firms with Varying Characteristics
 28 
Figure 4:  Sales Growth of Firms with Vary ng Characteristics  
Note: Industry 1 is Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining; Industry 2 is Construction and Utility; Industry 3 is Manufacturing; Industry 4 is 
Wholesale and Retail Trade and Transportation; Industry 5 is Other Services. The data source is the KIS-VALUE dataset. 























(b) Median Sales Growth by Firm Size
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(d) Median Sales Growth by Leverage
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(e) Median Sales Growth by ST Debt Ratio
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Note: Industry 1 is Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining; Industry 2 is Construction and Utility;
Industry 3 is Manufacturing; Industry 4 is Wholesale and Retail Trade and Transportation; Industry 5 is
Other Services. The data source is the KIS-VALUE dataset.
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Figure 17: LOGIT Regression Results
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Marginal Effect of Foreign Debt (Pre-crisis)
Note: In the upper panel, the solid line plots the estimated probability of exit for nonchaebol manufacturing
firms with different size, the foreign debt ratio at the mean level conditional on having positive foreign debt,
and all the other variables at the mean level of the sample. In the lower panel, the solid line plots the
estimated marginal effect of foreign debt on the exit probability in the crisis period for the same set of firms
as in the upper panel. The left panel is for the crisis period, and the right panel is for the pre-crisis period.
The dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals.
74
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Surviving Firms
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
All Firms
1 Number of Firms 3,151 3,956 4,285 5,066 5,476 5,606
2 Mean Age 17 17 16 16 15 15
3 Mean Real Assets 112 114 109 120 95 101
4 Median Real Assets 20 19 16 15 11 11
5 Median Real Sales Growth Rate (%) 15.3 13.9 10.5 6.7 -10.3 19.6
6 Median Profit Rate (%) 3.3 2.9 2.6 2 2.3 4.7
7 Mean Leverage Ratio (%) 76 76.6 76.5 77.1 72 67.3
8 Mean ST Debt Ratio (%) 30.5 30.7 30.4 29.7 30.4 29.7
9 Mean Foreign Debt Ratio (%) 4.3 4.4 4.4 6 5.3 4.3
10 Mean ST Foreign Debt Ratio (%) 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.2 1.9 1.9
11 Mean Exports/Sales Ratio (%) 7.7 7.1 6 5.2 5.6 4.7
12 Fraction of Exporters (%) 20.1 17.3 16.3 14 13.6 13.2
13 Fraction of Firms with Foreign Debt (%) 43.9 39.4 38.7 38 34.5 31.8
Publicly-Listed Firms
1 Number of Firms 881 959 988 1,046 1,049 1,064
2 Mean Age 22 22 21 22 22 22
3 Mean Real Assets 274 294 327 385 338 395
4 Median Real Assets 49 47 45 47 37 40
5 Median Real Sales Growth Rate (%) 14.8 14.5 9.7 7 -7.8 16.7
6 Median Profit Rate (%) 3.9 3.6 3 2.4 2.8 7.1
7 Mean Leverage Ratio (%) 71 70.8 70.4 71.7 67.1 59
8 Mean ST Debt Ratio (%) 28.2 28.6 28.4 28.9 28.4 25.7
9 Mean Foreign Debt Ratio (%) 6.1 6.3 6.8 8.8 7.3 6.4
10 Mean ST Foreign Debt Ratio (%) 2.7 3 3.2 4 3.2 3.5
11 Mean Exports/Sales Ratio (%) 11.3 10.6 9.7 8.3 9.1 8.3
12 Fraction of Exporters (%) 30.5 28.5 26.7 22.9 22.3 19.5
13 Fraction of Firms with Foreign Debt (%) 66.5 64.7 64 62.2 60.5 53.9
Note: Real assets are in billion 1994 won. The profit rate is defined as the ratio of the pre-tax profit and the
previous-year sales. The leverage ratio is defined as total liabilities over total assets. The ST debt ratio is
defined as the amount of debt with original maturity less than or equal to one year divided by total liabilities.
The foreign debt ratio is defined as foreign debt as a share of total liabilities. The foreign ST debt ratio is
defined as short-term foreign debt over total liabilities. We remove the top and bottom 1% observations in
terms of the sales growth rate and the profit rate.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Liquidated Firms
Panel A:
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1 Number of Exited Firms 71 100 218 206 57
Exit Rate (%) 2.2 2.5 4.8 3.9 1.0
Characteristics of Year Before Exit
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
2 Mean Age 11 9 10 12 12
3 Mean Real Assets 17 18 20 25 15
4 Median Real Assets 13 13 13 12 11
5 Median Real Sales Growth Rate (%) 11.3 17.1 5.4 3.2 -41.6
6 Median Profit Rate (%) 0.4 -0.7 0.1 -4.4 -12.6
7 Mean Leverage Ratio (%) 92.7 98.3 96.3 104 112.7
8 Mean ST Debt Ratio (%) 41 38.2 38.5 41 36.2
9 Mean Foreign Debt Ratio (%) 2.5 1.3 3.3 3.3 3.9
10 Mean ST Foreign Debt Ratio (%) 1 0.6 1.1 1.2 0.8
11 Mean Exports/Sales Ratio (%) 6.6 3.4 3.5 3 2
12 Fraction of Exporters (%) 12.7 5 10.6 5.8 5.3
13 Fraction of Firms with Foreign Debt (%) 22.5 16 25.7 28.2 24.6
Percentage of Exited Firms in
Industry 1 4 2 1 2 0
Industry 2 34 41 35 32 32
Industry 3 51 44 54 44 54
Industry 4 7 8 8 15 5
Industry 5 4 5 2 7 9
Panel B: Extensive versus Intensive Margin
Aggregate Sales Growth 18.06 12.49 10.19 -7.21 11.53
Intensive Margin 18.39 12.89 11.22 -5.91 11.69
Extensive Margin -0.34 -0.4 -1.03 -1.3 -0.16
% of aggregate sales growth -1.87 -3.21 -10.21 18.01 -1.41
Note: Exited firms are firms that are liquidated. The exit rate of year t is computed as the ratio of
the number of exited firms in year t and the sum of the number of firms survived from year t-1 to t
and the number of firms exited in year t. Characteristic statistics of exited firms are reported for the
year preceding the liquidation. The profit rate for exited firms is computed as the ratio of the after-tax
profit and the previous-year sales since we don’t have pre-tax profits for exited firms. The aggregate
sales growth is computed as the total sales of all surviving firms in period t+1 divided by the total
sales of both surviving and exited firms in period t. We measure the intensive margin with the ratio of
the total sales of surviving firms in year t+1 and t, and measure the extensive margin as the ratio of
the total year-t sales of exited firms and the total sales of all firms in year t. Industry 1 is Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing, and Mining; Industry 2 is Construction and Utility; Industry 3 is Manufacturing;
Industry 4 is Wholesale and Retail Trade and Transportation; Industry 5 is Other Services.
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Table 7: Cross-Section Regressions for Publicly-Listed Firms
Dependent Variable: Crisis Pre-Crisis
Sales Growth 1 2 3 4 5 6
Chaebol Dummy 0.098** 0.101** 0.098** 0.086** 0.091** 0.088**
(0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.077*** 0.031 0.033 -0.026** -0.017 -0.019
(0.017) (0.090) (0.090) (0.011) (0.037) (0.036)
Leverage Ratio 0.248** 4.15 4.265 -0.031 0.837 0.713
(0.117) (3.286) (3.272) (0.047) (0.831) (0.810)
Size * Leverage Ratio -0.162 -0.167 -0.035 -0.030
(0.132) (0.132) (0.034) (0.033)
ST Debt Ratio -0.204 -1.426 -1.434 -0.032 -1.705 -1.484
(0.129) (1.809) (1.907) (0.076) (1.365) (1.503)
Size * ST Debt Ratio 0.053 0.058 0.069 0.061
(0.072) (0.077) (0.055) (0.061)
Exports/Sales Ratio 0.211*** 0.185*** 0.163** -0.038 -0.032 -0.035
(0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
Foreign Debt Ratio 0.623** -0.503 0.017 0.348
(0.302) (4.539) (0.163) (2.430)
Size * Foreign Debt Ratio 0.044 -0.014
(0.174) (0.095)
ST Foreign Debt Ratio -4.464 -2.920
(3.325) (1.849)
Size * ST Foreign Debt Ratio 0.180 0.109
(0.131) (0.074)
LT Foreign Debt Ratio 1.982 1.316
(9.503) (2.917)
Size * LT Foreign Debt Ratio -0.029 -0.047
(0.361) (0.116)
Observations 988 988 988 881 881 881
R-squared 0.158 0.176 0.189 0.156 0.160 0.164
Note: The dependent variable is firm sales growth between 1997 and 1998 for the crisis regressions and sales
growth rate between 1995 and 1996 for the pre-crisis regressions. The independent variables are for year 1996
in the crisis regressions and for year 1994 in the pre-crisis regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *** denotes a p-value less than 1%, ** denotes a p-value less than 5%, and * denotes a p-value
less than 10%. All regressions include industry dummies at the two-digit level.
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Table 8: Cross-Section Regressions for the Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Crisis Pre-Crisis
Sales Growth 1 2 3 4 5 6
Chaebol Dummy 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.072***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.055*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.021*** 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.025) (0.025) (0.006) (0.023) (0.022)
Leverage Ratio 0.105*** 1.490* 1.517* 0.050 1.425** 1.363**
(0.038) (0.883) (0.882) (0.035) (0.607) (0.613)
Size * Leverage Ratio -0.059 -0.060 -0.058** -0.055**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.025) (0.026)
ST Debt Ratio -0.026 1.380* 1.172 0.017 -1.445* -1.214
(0.044) (0.801) (0.820) (0.059) (0.842) (0.867)
Size * ST Debt Ratio -0.060* -0.05 0.062* 0.052
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Exports/Sales Ratio 0.192*** 0.182*** 0.182*** -0.030 -0.028 -0.028
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Foreign Debt Ratio 0.417*** -2.817** 0.138 -1.297
(0.109) (1.326) (0.096) (1.782)
Size * Foreign Debt Ratio 0.134** 0.059
(0.053) (0.074)
ST Foreign Debt Ratio -4.600*** -5.501
(1.655) (3.597)
Size * ST Foreign Debt Ratio 0.194*** 0.228
(0.067) (0.154)
LT Foreign Debt Ratio -2.705 0.990
(2.173) (2.238)
Size * LT Foreign Debt Ratio 0.141 -0.034
(0.087) (0.092)
Observations 4,285 4,285 4,285 3,151 3,151 3,151
R-squared 0.093 0.099 0.102 0.059 0.063 0.064
Note: The dependent variable is firm sales growth between 1997 and 1998 for the crisis regressions and sales
growth rate between 1995 and 1996 for the pre-crisis regressions. The independent variables are for year 1996
in the crisis regressions and for year 1994 in the pre-crisis regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *** denotes a p-value less than 1%, ** denotes a p-value less than 5%, and * denotes a p-value
less than 10%. All regressions include industry dummies at the two-digit level.
Table 9: Joint Distribution of Foreign Debt and Export Status
Firms with Foreign Debt Firms with No Foreign Debt
Total Fraction of Fraction of Total Fraction of Fraction of
Number Exporters Non-Exporters Number Exporters Non-Exporters
Full Sample 1,660 28.73 71.27 2,625 8.5 91.5
Asset bins
1 83 10.84 89.16 988 5.06 94.94
2 384 24.22 75.78 687 11.64 88.36
3 497 30.38 69.62 574 9.93 90.07
4 696 32.18 67.82 376 9.57 90.43
Publicly- 632 34.18 65.82 356 13.48 86.52
listed Firms
Note: A firm is classified as an exporter if its export-sales ratio is positive, and as a non-exporter otherwise.
A firm is classified as a foreign debt holder if its foreign debt holdings are positive, and as a non-foreign-debt
holder otherwise.
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Table 10: Coefficients in Logit Exit Regressions
Crisis Pre-Crisis
1 2 3 4 5 6
Chaebol Dummy -0.654* -0.540 -0.531
(0.364) (0.365) (0.365)
Age -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Size 0.086* 0.153*** 0.149*** -0.173*** -0.114* -0.103
(0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067)
Leverage Ratio 2.278*** 2.176*** 2.168*** 0.815*** 0.787*** 0.786***
(0.397) (0.389) (0.387) (0.302) (0.300) (0.302)
ST Debt Ratio 1.691*** 1.678*** 1.727*** 0.921** 0.909** 0.875**
(0.289) (0.291) (0.296) (0.420) (0.420) (0.425)
Profit/Assets -2.066* -2.160* -2.145* -3.637*** -3.658*** -3.681***
(1.234) (1.186) (1.190) (0.935) (0.936) (0.936)
Exports/Sales Ratio -0.576 -0.509 -0.509 0.364 0.456 0.455
(0.460) (0.455) (0.457) (0.549) (0.541) (0.543)
Foreign Debt Ratio -0.038 61.090*** -0.874 60.510***
(0.725) (12.880) (1.866) (22.410)
Size * Foreign Debt Ratio -2.608*** -2.669***
(0.555) (0.994)
ST Foreign Debt Ratio 72.640*** 92.060*
(27.160) (52.370)
Size * ST Foreign Debt Ratio -3.146*** -3.944*
(1.173) (2.254)
LT Foreign Debt Ratio 48.980*** 61.000**
(16.990) (30.740)
Size * LT Foreign Debt Ratio -2.058*** -2.731*
(0.742) (1.412)
Observations 4,696 4,696 4,696 3,398 3,398 3,398
Pseudo R-squared 0.156 0.162 0.162 0.135 0.139 0.139
Note: The dependent variable is either 1 if the firm exits in 1997 and 1998 or 0 otherwise for the crisis
regressions, and is either 1 if the firm exits in 1995 and 1996 or 0 otherwise in the pre-crisis regressions. The
independent variables are for 1996 in the crisis regressions and for 1994 for the pre-crisis regressions. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes a p-value less than 1%, ** denotes a p-value less












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Profit Regressions for Publicly Listed Firms
Dependent Variable: Crisis Pre-Crisis
Profit/Sales−1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Chaebol Dummy 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.036*** -0.008 -0.007 -0.009** 0.018 0.019
(0.006) (0.019) (0.020) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017)
Leverage -0.091*** 0.687 0.708 -0.040* 0.895* 0.889*
(0.034) (0.570) (0.570) (0.024) (0.517) (0.523)
Size * Leverage -0.032 -0.033 -0.038* -0.038*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
ST Debt Ratio -0.063** 0.496 0.494 -0.071*** 0.018 0.096
(0.031) (0.436) (0.473) (0.023) (0.302) (0.335)
Size * ST Debt Ratio -0.023 -0.022 -0.004 -0.007
(0.018) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014)
Exports/Sales 0.133*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.025* 0.025* 0.025*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Foreign Debt Ratio 0.205*** -0.748 -0.013 -0.388
(0.055) (0.753) (0.046) (0.480)
Size * Foreign Debt Ratio 0.038 0.015
(0.030) (0.019)
ST Foreign Debt Ratio -1.443 -0.369
(0.962) (0.716)
Size * ST Foreign Debt Ratio 0.062 0.017
(0.039) (0.029)
LT Foreign Debt Ratio -0.314 -0.179
(1.438) (0.760)
Size * LT Foreign Debt Ratio 0.026 0.004
(0.058) (0.030)
Observations 988 988 988 881 881 881
R-squared 0.182 0.189 0.192 0.19 0.202 0.204
Note: The dependent variable is firm profits in 1998 as a share of sales in 1997 for the crisis regressions and
firm profits in 1996 as a share of sales in 1995 for the pre-crisis regressions. The independent variables are
for year 1996 in the crisis regressions and for year 1994 in the pre-crisis regressions. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *** denotes a p-value less than 1%, ** denotes a p-value less than 5%, and *
denotes a p-value less than 10%. All regressions include industry dummies at the two-digit level.
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Table 13: Profit Regressions for the Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Crisis Pre-Crisis
Profit/Sales−1 1 2 3 1 2 3
Chaebol Dummy -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 0.015* 0.017* 0.016*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Size -0.022*** 0.023** 0.0242** -0.008*** 0.017 0.018
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016)
Leverage -0.129*** 1.012*** 1.013*** -0.122*** 0.457 0.454
(0.018) (0.292) (0.292) (0.025) (0.483) (0.479)
Size * Leverage -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.024 -0.024
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021)
ST Debt Ratio -0.054*** 0.702*** 0.745*** -0.054*** 0.521* 0.576*
(0.014) (0.209) (0.217) (0.018) (0.297) (0.304)
Size * ST Debt Ratio -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.024* -0.027**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Exports/ Sales 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.075*** -0.007 -0.009 -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Foreign Debt Ratio 0.090*** -0.424 -0.033 0.018
(0.030) (0.412) (0.037) (0.453)
Size * Foreign Debt Ratio 0.021 -0.002
(0.017) (0.018)
ST Foreign Debt Ratio -1.032* 0.263
(0.571) (0.547)
Size * ST Foreign Debt Ratio 0.0465* -0.009
(0.024) (0.023)
LT Foreign Debt Ratio 0.159 0.141
(0.660) (0.674)
Size * LT Foreign Debt Ratio -0.004 -0.01
(0.028) (0.028)
Observations 4,285 4,285 4,285 3,151 3,151 3,151
R-squared 0.132 0.145 0.145 0.120 0.125 0.126
Note: The dependent variable is firm profits in 1998 as a share of sales in 1997 for the crisis regressions and
firm profits in 1996 as a share of sales in 1995 for the pre-crisis regressions. The independent variables are
for year 1996 in the crisis regressions and for year 1994 in the pre-crisis regressions. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *** denotes a p-value less than 1%, ** denotes a p-value less than 5%, and *
denotes a p-value less than 10%. All regressions include industry dummies at the two-digit level.
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Table 14: Investment Regressions for Publicly-listed Firms
Dependent Variable: Crisis Pre-Crisis
I/K−1 1 2 3 1 2 3
Chaebol Dummy 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.190*** 0.193*** 0.190***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.008 0.079 0.08 -0.008 0.027 0.027
(0.011) (0.051) (0.051) (0.015) (0.035) (0.035)
Leverage 0.007 2.947* 2.958* -0.050 1.528* 1.542*
(0.086) (1.649) (1.655) (0.035) (0.893) (0.906)
Size * Leverage -0.121* -0.122* -0.065* -0.065*
(0.067) (0.067) (0.036) (0.037)
ST Debt Ratio 0.023 -0.414 -0.388 0.037 -0.274 -0.27
(0.075) (1.192) (1.282) (0.085) (1.391) (1.532)
Size * ST Debt Ratio 0.019 0.018 0.012 0.011
(0.049) (0.053) (0.057) (0.063)
Exports/ Sales 0.076 0.057 0.056 -0.077 -0.075 -0.068
(0.058) (0.045) (0.046) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
Foreign Debt Ratio -0.146 -0.760 0.083 -2.355
(0.096) (1.543) (0.173) (1.928)
Size * Foreign Debt Ratio 0.024 0.098
(0.062) (0.078)
ST Foreign Debt Ratio -1.255 -0.457
(2.030) (3.250)
Size * ST Foreign Debt Ratio 0.042 0.032
(0.083) (0.130)
LT Foreign Debt Ratio -0.371 -3.777
(2.912) (2.884)
Size * LT Foreign Debt Ratio 0.010 0.144
(0.118) (0.117)
Lagged I/K−1 0.081*** 0.076** 0.076** 0.175*** 0.167*** 0.167***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Observations 949 949 949 864 864 864
R-squared 0.067 0.085 0.086 0.185 0.189 0.191
Note: The dependent variable is firm real investment in 1998 as a share of the replacement value of real
capital stock in 1997 for the crisis regressions and firm real investment in 1996 as a share of the replacement
value of real capital stock in 1995 for the pre-crisis regressions. The independent variables are for year 1996
in the crisis regressions and for year 1994 in the pre-crisis regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *** denotes a p-value less than 1%, ** denotes a p-value less than 5%, and * denotes a p-value
less than 10%. All regressions include industry dummies at the two-digit level.
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Table 15: Investment Regressions for the Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Crisis Pre-Crisis
I/K−1 1 2 3 1 2 3
Chaebol Dummy 0.056* 0.048 0.049 0.182*** 0.175*** 0.174***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.015** -0.013 -0.013 -0.023*** -0.007 -0.006
(0.006) (0.023) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023)
Leverage 0.018 0.567 0.564 -0.034 1.344** 1.345**
(0.029) (0.710) (0.710) (0.035) (0.628) (0.633)
Size * Leverage -0.023 -0.023 -0.058** -0.058**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
ST Debt Ratio -0.018 -1.041 -1.048 -0.038 -1.662* -1.593
(0.035) (0.705) (0.730) (0.044) (0.959) (1.010)
Size * ST Debt Ratio 0.044 0.044 0.0689* 0.065
(0.030) (0.031) (0.041) (0.043)
Exports/ Sales 0.072* 0.070* 0.070* -0.009 -0.006 -0.004
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Foreign Debt Ratio 0.032 -2.185* -0.067 -4.308***
(0.075) (1.287) (0.091) (1.330)
Size * Foreign Debt Ratio 0.092* 0.175***
(0.054) (0.055)
ST Foreign Debt Ratio -1.552 -2.763
(2.341) (2.789)
Size * ST Foreign Debt Ratio 0.067 0.122
(0.096) (0.115)
LT Foreign Debt Ratio -2.633 -4.903**
(1.868) (1.977)
Size * LT Foreign Debt Ratio 0.109 0.193**
(0.079) (0.082)
Lagged I/K−1 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.161***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 4,072 4,072 4,072 2,970 2,970 2,970
R-squared 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.097 0.102 0.103
Note: The dependent variable is firm real investment in 1998 as a share of the replacement value of real
capital stock in 1997 for the crisis regressions and firm real investment in 1996 as a share of the replacement
value of real capital stock in 1995 for the pre-crisis regressions. The independent variables are for year 1996
in the crisis regressions and for year 1994 in the pre-crisis regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *** denotes a p-value less than 1%, ** denotes a p-value less than 5%, and * denotes a p-value
less than 10%. All regressions include industry dummies at the two-digit level.
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CHAPTER III




Estimates of structural impulse response functions are of central interest in empirical
macroeconomics. Conventional estimates of structural impulse responses are based on
vector autoregressive (VAR) models. VAR impulse response coefficients are nonlinear
functions of the estimates of the VAR slope parameters and of the VAR innovation
variance-covariance matrix. It is well known that the finite-sample accuracy of con-
ventional asymptotic and bootstrap approximations to the distribution of the impulse
response estimator is undermined by the bias of the impulse response estimator. This
bias arises from two distinct sources: the small-sample bias of the estimates of the
VAR slope parameters and the additional bias induced by the non-linear transforma-
tions of the estimated parameters.
Over the last two decades, several econometric methods have been proposed to
address this problem. For example, the bias-corrected bootstrap confidence inter-
val of Kilian (1998a) explicitly accounts for the first source of bias by constructing
bias-corrected slope coefficient estimates. This bias-adjusted bootstrap provides a
significant improvement in coverage accuracy over the standard bootstrap of Runkle
(1987) and the asymptotic delta method interval of Lütkepohl (1990), but it does not
necessarily yield accurate coverage when the process is highly persistent or when the
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model includes deterministic time trends.48 A large number of studies has investigated
the small-sample and asymptotic accuracy of these methods (see, e.g., Griffiths and
Lütkepohl (1993), Fachin and Bravetti (1996). Kilian (1998a,b,c; 1999), Berkowitz
and Kilian (2000), Benkwitz, Lütkepohl and Neumann (2000), and Kilian (2001)).49
Kilian and Chang (2000) demonstrated that the coverage accuracy of all tradi-
tional asymptotic and bootstrap methods, including bias-adjusted methods, tends
to deteriorate in large-dimensional VAR models at longer horizons, when the data
are highly persistent. This finding motivated the use of nonstandard asymptotic ap-
proximations based on local-to-unity models. Since the bias of the impulse responses
typically worsens, as the dominant autoregressive root approaches unity, that ap-
proach seemed well suited to dealing with the bias problem. For example, Wright
(2000), building on Stock (1991), proposed conservative asymptotic impulse response
confidence intervals based on local-to-unity approximations to the largest root of the
autoregressive process. His method proved computationally intractable in VAR mod-
els, however. In related work, Gospodinov (2004) proposed an asymptotic impulse
response confidence interval based on the inversion of the likelihood ratio statistic.
His method differs from Wright (2000) in that his interval is not conservative, but
asymptotically exact. Gospodinov’s approach, however, is limited to univariate au-
toregressions and requires knowledge of a point null which is unlikely to be available
in practice. As yet another alternative, Hansen (1999) proposed a grid bootstrap
method for the dominant root in univariate autoregressive processes. This grid boot-
strap provides correct asymptotic coverage regardless of whether the autoregressive
model is near-integrated or exactly integrated. Gospodinov (2004), however, reports
that the coverage accuracy of the grid bootstrap method applied to impulse responses
is too low at short horizons. Pesavento and Rossi (2006) were the first to propose
48An alternative bias-adjusted method for impulse responses in univariate autoregressions has
been proposed by Andrews and Chen (1994). Related work also includes Rudebusch (1992).
49Related studies focusing on univariate autoregressions include Berkowitz, Birgean and Kilian
(1999), Inoue and Kilian (2002a, 2003), and Pesavento and Rossi (2007).
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operational confidence intervals for VAR impulse responses based on a local-to-unity
approximation to the asymptotic distribution of that estimator. Their method is
designed to achieve accurate coverage at long horizons when the data are highly per-
sistent. At short horizons, its coverage accuracy may not be satisfactory. Pesavento
and Rossi (2006) also proposed another method designed to yield accurate coverage
at both short and long horizons, but that method may be conservative at medium
horizons. Thus, even twenty years after the first confidence intervals were developed
for VAR impulse responses, there is no single method that resolves the bias problem
in all situations.
Our paper explores a new idea for dealing with this bias problem that is motivated
by recent advances in estimating impulse response functions from local projections.
Local (linear) projections (LPs) were proposed by Jordà (2005, 2007) on the grounds
that such projections may be more robust to model misspecification. We instead
focus on another potentially attractive feature of that method, namely its ability
to ameliorate the bias problem that has undermined the accuracy of inference on
impulse responses in practice. The basic idea of the LP method is that we directly
estimate a sequence of linear projections of the future value of the dependent variable
on the current information set. This approach will be asymptotically equivalent to
the VAR-based approach, provided the data generating process is stationary and
linear. Unlike VAR impulse response estimates, however, impulse responses based on
local projections do not require any nonlinear transformations of the estimated slope
parameters. Rather the slope parameters themselves are the reduced-form impulse
response coefficients and - with the help of any estimate of the structural impact
multiplier matrix - can easily be used to construct the structural impulse response
function. Since local projections do not involve any nonlinear transformation, they
are likely to be better approximated by Gaussian distributions. A very similar point
has been made by Davidson (2000) in the context of bootstrap methods. Thus,
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local projection methods have the potential of greatly reducing the bias of impulse
response point estimates and of increasing the coverage accuracy of impulse response
confidence intervals.
The LP method is not without drawbacks, however. One of its potential disadvan-
tages is that the LP estimator tends to have higher variance, when the data generating
process is well approximated by a vector autoregression, since local projections im-
pose less structure on the estimation problem. This increase in the variance would be
expected to increase the mean-squared error (MSE) of impulse response point esti-
mates and the average length of LP impulse response confidence intervals. Moreover,
nothing is known about the extent of small-sample bias in the slope parameters of
local projections compared with the well-known small-sample bias in the VAR slope
parameters (see Pope 1990). Hence, the question of whether local projections should
replace VAR models in constructing structural impulse response point and interval
estimates is ultimately an empirical question.
In this paper, we address this question by comparing the finite-sample properties
of impulse response confidence intervals estimated by VAR models and by local pro-
jections using simulation studies. Our objective is to provide some practical guidance
about which of the combinations of estimation method (VAR versus LP) and method
of inference (asymptotic versus bootstrap) is likely to be most reliable in practice,
when the VAR framework is considered a good approximation to the data generating
process. Throughout the paper we will maintain the assumption of stationarity. A
summary of the alternative approaches considered in this paper is provided in Table
16.
We make three distinct contributions. First, for each method, we compare the
pointwise coverage accuracy and average length of the asymptotic and bootstrap
confidence interval in stationary models. Our analysis allows for model specifica-
tion uncertainty. Specifically, for the VAR model we focus on (1) the asymptotic
88
delta method interval of Lütkepohl (1990) and (2) percentile intervals based on the
bias-corrected bootstrap method proposed by Kilian (1998a,b; 1999). For local projec-
tions, in contrast, we investigate (3) the asymptotic interval proposed by Jordà (2005,
2007) and (4) we propose a bootstrap percentile interval based on a suitably designed
block bootstrap method.50 We provide some intuition for the relative performance
of these approaches by investigating the bias, standard deviation, and MSE of the
impulse response point estimators. Our simulation analysis is based on a commonly
used stylized bivariate VAR(1) data generating process as well as an additional high-
dimensional VAR data generating process of the type used in studying responses to
monetary policy shocks. Such realistic models are rarely analyzed in the literature,
given the computational costs of simulating large-dimensional VAR systems.51
We find that, contrary to our conjecture, the LP point estimator tends to be both
more biased and more variable than VAR based estimator, resulting in often exces-
sively wide LP intervals with less than nominal coverage. Given its greater average
width, the asymptotic LP interval tends to be more accurate than the VAR delta
method interval. It also is more accurate than the bootstrap percentile LP interval,
although again at the cost of added width. The reason is that standard applications of
the bootstrap tend to reinforce the small-sample bias, much like in the Runkle (1987)
method (see Kilian 1998a). Unlike in the VAR context, there is no obvious way of
correcting for this bias in the LP estimator. The bias-adjusted VAR bootstrap inter-
val, in contrast, tends to be more accurate than either LP interval in small samples
and typically shorter on average. It also is more accurate than traditional asymptotic
delta method intervals and only slightly wider on average, consistent with previous
findings in the literature. Thus, for pointwise impulse response intervals, among the
50Although Jordà (2007) discusses the potential benefits from bootstrapping local projections,
he does not explore bootstrap methods in his work. Our bootstrap percentile interval provides an
alternative to asymptotic inference. We do not investigate the use of percentile-t intervals for the
LP method since it is not clear how to estimate the variance of the bootstrap impulse response
estimator.
51Kilian and Chang (2000) is a notable exception.
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methods considered, no method is more accurate than the bias-adjusted bootstrap
method for VAR models. For larger sample sizes, the LP asymptotic interval and
the VAR bootstrap interval have similar coverage accuracy, but the LP interval tends
to be much wider on average. Additional simulation evidence suggests that similar
results hold even for VARMA data generating processes, when the finite lag order
VAR model is only an approximation.
Second, in addition to evaluating the pointwise coverage accuracy of the intervals
at each impulse response horizon, we also evaluate the coverage accuracy of the joint
confidence interval proposed by Jordà (2007) whose small-sample properties have not
been examined previously. These joint intervals can be computed from either local
projections or VAR models. Joint confidence intervals are of particular interest to
empirical researchers who want to evaluate the uncertainty about the entire path of
the impulse response function. We focus on the asymptotic interval estimates (5) and
(6). Our simulation results suggest that the coverage accuracy of the joint intervals
can be erratic, regardless of the method used. Thus, joint intervals have to be used
with caution. Our analysis also shows that neither interval is uniformly preferred
over the other, although the joint LP interval is invariably much wider on average.
Bootstrapping the standard error does not improve the accuracy of the asymptotic
LP interval.
Third, we illustrate the practical differences that may arise from the choice of dif-
ferent methods of estimation and inference by re-examining the empirical findings for
a standard monthly VAR model of monetary policy. Using data for 1970.1-2007.12,
the VAR model provides evidence that monetary policy contractions cause a tempo-
rary reduction in output and a temporary drop in real commodity prices, but we find
no evidence that inflation is significantly reduced. Despite the inclusion of commod-
ity prices, the estimates exhibit the well known price puzzle. The use of joint VAR
intervals does not change any of these conclusions, although it affects the degree of
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statistical significance especially at longer horizons. Since most statistically signifi-
cant impulse response estimates are obtained at shorter horizons, when pointwise and
joint intervals tend to be similar, we conclude that typically the use of joint intervals
will not overturn the substantive findings of VAR studies based on pointwise inter-
vals. Likewise, estimates from the LP and VAR method are qualitatively similar, but
the LP estimates tend to be more erratic and less precisely estimated. This tendency
is even more pronounced if we focus on subsamples such as the post-Volcker period.
Our analysis provides no compelling reason to abandon traditional VAR methods of
constructing impulse response estimates in favor of the LP method.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly establishes
the notation and contrasts the construction of impulse response estimates from VAR
models and from local projections. In section 3.3, we build intuition based on results
from a Monte Carlo study that employs a stylized bivariate VAR(1) data-generating
process used in the previous literature. The simulation results for a more realistic
VAR(12) model are presented in section 3.4 along with a comparison of the empirical
estimates. Section 3.5 contains some preliminary simulation results for infinite-order
VAR processes. We conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Review of VARs and Local Projections
3.2.1 Data-Generating Process
Consider aK-dimensional linear vector autoregressive data-generating processes (DGP)
of finite order p:52
yt = B1yt−1 + · · ·+Bpyt−p + et, (16)
52This approach is standard in the literature. Alternatively, one could interpret a vector autore-
gression as an approximation to general stationary linear DGP (see, e.g., Lütkepohl and Poskitt
1991; Inoue and Kilian 2002). This case will be addressed in section 3.5.
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where t = p+ 1, ..., T , yt = (y1t, · · · , yKt)′ is a (K × 1) random vector, Bi, i = 1, ..., p,
are (K×K) coefficient matrices and et = (e1t, · · · , eKt)′ is K-dimensional i.i.d. white
noise, i.e., E(et) = 0, E(ete
′
s) = 0 for s 6= t and E(ete′t) = Σe where Σe is non-singular
and positive definite.53 All values of z satisfying det(IK − B1z − · · · − Bpzp) = 0
lie outside the unit circle. For expository purposes, we abstract from deterministic
regressors, although we will allow for an intercept in estimation throughout this paper.
This VAR process can be written in structural form as:
A0yt = A1yt−1 + · · ·+ Apyt−p + εt, (17)
where Σε = IK without loss of generality.
3.2.2 Impulse Responses








h−l Bl, h = 1, 2, . . . , H, (18)
where Φ
V AR(p)
0 = IK and Bl = 0 for l > p. The corresponding responses to structural







0 , h = 0, 1, . . . , H, (19)





′ = Σe. For the purpose of the analysis below, we pos-





represents the response of variable i to a one-time structural shock j, h periods ago.
By construction, θ
V AR(p)
ij,h is a nonlinear function of B and Σe. Estimates Θ̂
V AR(p)
h are
53The assumption of i.i.d. innovations is common in applied work and provides a useful benchmark
for our purposes. It could be relaxed with suitable changes in the theory and implementation of the
asymptotic and bootstrap approach (see Goncalves and Kilian 2004, 2007).
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constructed by substituting the least-squares estimates of B and Σe obtained from
regression (16).
An alternative approach to estimating reduced form impulse responses is to fit
the linear projection
yt+h = µ+ F1yt + F2yt−1 + · · ·+ Fqyt−q+1 + ut+h for h = 1, . . . , H, (20)
where ut may be serially correlated or heteroskedastic (see Jordà 2005, 2007). The
lag length q needs not be common across different horizons. By construction, the
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the response of variable i to a one-time structural shock j, h periods ago. Estimates
Θ̂
LP (q)
h are constructed from the the VAR(p) estimate Â
−1
0 and the Φ̂
LP (q)
h estimates
obtained from a sequence of least-squares regressions (20) for each horizon h. Under





be consistent for θ
V AR(p)
ij,h .
54Jordà (2005) does not explicitly discuss the distinction between the structural and reduced-form
impulse responses. The Gauss code provided by Jordà, however, shows that his structural impulse




Let β = vec(B1, B2, · · · , Bp) and σ = vech(Σe). Under suitable moment restrictions,
the asymptotic distribution of the VAR impulse response estimator can be derived



















where C0 = 0, Ch = (A
−1
0 ⊗ IK)Gh with Gh = ∂vec(Φ
V AR(p)
h )/∂β
′, and C̄h =
(IK ⊗ ΦV AR(p)h )∂vec(A
−1
0 )/∂σ
′. Explicit expressions for the asymptotic variance of
the impulse response estimator can be found in Lütkepohl (1990). The nominal








































, z1−α/2 denotes the (1− α/2)-quantile of the N(0, 1) distri-
bution.
The asymptotic confidence interval of the corresponding LP estimator proposed














































where Mx = I − X (X ′X)−1X ′, X =
[
1 yt−1 yt−2 . . . yt−q
]
, Ḡh =
(IK ⊗ΦLP (q)h )∂vec(A
−1
0 )/∂σ
′, and Σ̂u = E(ut+hu
′
t+h) in equation (20). The first addi-





and reflects the uncertainty associated with the slope parameter estimates. The sec-
ond additive component incorporates the estimation uncertainty associated with the
estimate of A−10 (see Jordà 2007).
55 Following Jordà (2005), we employ the Newey-
West estimator of Σ̂u.
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Bootstrap Confidence Intervals
Confidence intervals can also be obtained by bootstrap approximations. For the VAR
impulse response estimator, we consider the well-established bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence interval proposed by Kilian (1998a, 1999). The reader is referred to the
relevant literature for details of that procedure.57 For the LP impulse response esti-
mator, no bootstrap methods have been considered to date. Although Jordà (2007)
discusses the potential benefits from bootstrapping the LP estimator, he does not ex-
plore any bootstrap methods in his work. In this paper, we propose a block bootstrap
approach since the error term in LP regressions is serially correlated. By construc-
tion, the LP impulse response estimate for horizon h depends on the (1 + q) tuple
(yt+h, yt, yt−1, · · · , yt−q+1). To preserve the correlation in the data, we first construct
the set of all possible (1 + q) tuples. Then blocks of l consecutive (1 + q) tuples
55Jordà (2005) abstracts from this second component. This causes the asymptotic interval for
LP too narrow at short horizons. Additional simulation results show that adding the second term
significantly improves coverage accuracy of the asymptotic confidence interval at short horizons,
with a marginal increase in average length.
56Jordà (2005) shows that the disturbance terms in a local projection has a moving average
component of order h under our assumptions: ut+h = et+h + Φ
V AR
1 et+h−1 + Φ
V AR
2 et+h−2 + · · · +
ΦV ARh−1 et+1. This suggests that we set the truncation lag for the Newey-West estimator to be h for
each local projection horizon h. While the results are not overly sensitive to the choice of the
truncation lag, estimating Σu by least squares would seriously undermine the accuracy of the LP
interval.
57We implement this method as discussed in Kilian (1998b,c, 1999) using the full double loop
rather than using the computational short-cut proposed in Kilian (1998a). The first-order bias
is estimated using the asymptotic closed-form solutions proposed by Pope (1990) rather than the
bootstrap method. For a detailed description see, e.g., Kilian (1998b).
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are drawn (see, e.g., Berkowitz, Birgean and Kilian (1999) for a review of this boot-
strap method) and used in the construction of Φ̂LP∗h . In constructing Θ̂
LP∗
h , for each
bootstrap replication, we construct A−1∗0 based on a draw Σ̂
∗
e from the asymptotic
distribution of Σ̂V ARe .
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A nominal (1−α)% percentile confidence interval may be constructed, conditional
















ij,h,(1−α/2) are the α/2 and 1−α/2 quantiles of the distribution
of θ̂
LP (q)∗
ij,h . Under asymptotic normality, this interval provides a valid first-order ap-
proximation (see Efron and Tibshirani 1993). In principle, an alternative could have































where t∗1−α denotes the 1−α quantile of the distribution of







is an estimate of the standard deviation of θ̂
LP (q)∗
ij,h . The problem with
this proposal is that it is not clear how to estimate the variance of the bootstrap LP
impulse response estimator in constructing the studentized statistic t∗. The Newey-
West estimator of Jordà (2007) cannot be used since we rely on the block bootstrap
for generating bootstrap draws. Nor can the variance of the estimator be simulated
by the bootstrap method, conditional on a given realization of the block-bootstrap
estimator. For that reason we do not consider the percentile-t interval.
58Preliminary simulation experiements suggested that treating Σ∗e as random improved the cov-




In addition to the pointwise confidence intervals described so far, we consider the
joint confidence regions proposed by Jordà (2007). Let the (K(H + 1) ×K) matrix
Θ be a set of impulse responses for horizon 0 to H. Let θ denote vec(Θ) and θ̂ the
corresponding estimator. Jordà observes that
√
T (θ̂ − θ) d−→ N(0,Ωθ),
where Ωθ is the (K
2(H + 1) × K2(H + 1)) limiting variance-covariance matrix of
all structural impulse response coefficients up to some horizon H. The confidence
region that contains the entire impulse response path with probability 100(1 − α)%
in repeated sampling is a multidimensional ellipsoid which cannot be displayed easily.
Jordà suggests that this joint confidence region can be approximated by Scheffé’s








where θij = [θij,0, θij,1, θij,2, · · · , θij,H ]′, c21−α is the critical value of the chi-square
distribution with H + 1 degrees of freedom, iH+1 is a (H + 1) × 1 vector of ones.
Explicit expressions for Ω̂θ,ij that are applicable to both VAR and LP estimators
are presented in Jordà (2007). The joint variance-covariance matrix of the impulse











2 (IK ⊗ Φ))CD+K (Σe ⊗ Σe)D
+′
K C
′ (IK ⊗ Φ)′ , (30)
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, and LK is the elimination matrix,
KKK the commutation matrix, and D
+
K is the duplication matrix defined in Lütkepohl
(2005, Appendix 12.2). In practice, we substitute consistent estimators for the un-
known expressions Φ, Σu, Σe and A
−1
0 . We deal with possible serial correlation in the
error term of the local projection by employing the Newey-West estimator of Σu with
a truncation lag corresponding to the maximum impulse response horizon. Additional
simulation evidence (not shown) suggests that somewhat tighter joint intervals may
be obtained at the cost of more erratic coverage accuracy by lowering the truncation
lag. Alternatively, the joint variance-covariance matrix may be evaluated using the
bootstrap method conditional on the original data.
In the applications below we adopt a suggestion by Jordà and Marcellino (2009)











Additional simulation evidence shows that this modification tends to improve the
finite-sample accuracy of the joint interval.
3.2.4 Evaluation Criteria
We are interested in comparing the small-sample performance of impulse responses
estimated by local projections and by conventional VAR methods. One set of criteria
are the effective coverage accuracy and average length of pointwise impulse responses
confidence intervals. Effective coverage is defined as the relative frequency with which
the confidence interval covers the true, but in practice unknown value of the impulse
response in repeated sampling. Average length is the average distance between the
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upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval in repeated trials. In addition, we
report the bias, standard deviation and mean-squared error of the impulse response
point estimates to help explain differences in coverage accuracy and average length.
For the joint confidence interval, we calculate the probability that the interval es-
timator contains the entire path of the true impulse response function in repeated
sampling. We also report the average interval length. Throughout the paper, we
focus on nominal 95% confidence intervals. Qualitatively similar results are obtained
for nominal 68% intervals.
3.3 Simulation Evidence: Bivariate VAR(1) Model
In this section, we perform a simulation study to evaluate the relative small-sample
performance of VARs and LPs in the context of a stationary VAR(1)-DGP. The
results will help build intuition before we turn to a more realistic DGP in the next













where B11 ∈ {0.5, 0.9, 0.97} . The intercept has been normalized to zero in population.
This DGP has been used widely in the literature as a benchmark (see, e.g., Griffiths
and Lütkepohl 1993, Fachin and Bravetti 1996, Kilian 1998a,b; Berkowitz and Kilian
2000).
We draw 1,000 time series of length T = 100 from this process.59 For each trial,
we fit the VAR model and a sequence of LP models, one each for each horizon. All
regression models include an intercept.60 The lag-order for each local projection is
59Initially, we also considered a sample size of T = 50. In that case, the Σ∗ draws required for the
LP bootstrap method sometimes are not positive definite, making it impossible to implement the
LP method. Hence, we focus on the larger sample size.
60With the exception of the construction of joint confidence regions in section 3.3.2 and 3.4.1, we
follow Jordà’s (2005) proposal of fitting individual projections rather than doing one projection for
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chosen by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) with an upper bound of four lags.61
The same criterion and upper bound is used in selecting the lag order of the fitted VAR





the pointwise confidence intervals discussed earlier. All bootstrap confidence intervals
are based on 2,000 bootstrap replications. For the block bootstrap method, the size
of the block is set to four at all horizons. This produces the most accurate results for
the LP intervals.62 The maximum horizon H of the impulse response function is 16.
3.3.1 Pointwise Intervals
Figure 18 shows some representative results for alternative values of B11. The larger
B11, the higher the persistence of the process. The upper panel of Figure 18 plots
the effective coverage rates of nominal 95% confidence interval for θ21,h, where θ21,h
stands for the response of variable 2 to structural shock 1 in period 0 at horizon
h = 0, ..., 16. The difference in performance between the four methods is substantial.
The effective coverage rates of the standard VAR delta method interval drops quickly
with increasing horizon, consistent with earlier results in the literature. At horizon
16, it is 81% for B11 = 0.5, 69% for B11 = 0.9 and 60% for B11 = 0.97. On the other
hand, the effective coverage of the bias-corrected bootstrap for the VAR remains fairly
close to 95% at all time horizons and for all values of B11. This result illustrates that
the small-sample bias in the impulse response estimates by the VAR is substantial
and that the asymptotic normal approximation in the delta method interval may not
all horizons joinly. In additional sensitivity analysis we determined that the joint linear projection
is less accurate than the individual linear projections in small samples.
61The local projections with the lag order selected for each horizon have better small sample
properties than the local projections using the same lag order for all horizons. The AIC with the
maximum lag order of four performs better than the AIC with the upper bound of eight lags or the
SIC with either a maximum lag order of four or eight. A natural conjecture is that the performance
of the LP method may be improved by enforcing greater parsimony. For example, one could set
q = 1 in all LP regressions. Further analysis (not shown) suggests that this modification may greatly
reduce the coverage accuracy of the LP interval in practice.
62We also investigated whether the LP bootstrap interval performed better when allowing for
different block sizes by horizon, and found that a fixed block size produces more accurate intervals.
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be a good approximation to the impulse response distribution in small samples.
Unlike the coverage accuracy of the asymptotic VAR interval, that of the asymp-
totic LP interval does not deteriorate sharply as the horizon increases, but its overall
coverage accuracy declines somewhat with increasing B11. Whereas the asymptotic
LP interval tends to attain close to nominal coverage for B11 = 0.5, its accuracy may
drop as low as 91% for B11 = 0.9 and 89% for B11 = 0.97. While far from perfect,
these results are clearly superior to the VAR delta method. This finding suggests that
indeed there are potential advantages to using local projections. It may be tempting
to attribute these differences to the fact that the LP impulse response estimator does
not require any non-linear transformations and hence is less biased. This is not the
case. As Figure 19 shows, the bias of the VAR impulse response estimator is actually
similar at low horizons and smaller than the bias of the LP estimator at long horizons.
There is no evidence of reduced bias. Instead, the reason for the superior coverage
accuracy of the LP interval is the higher variability of the LP estimator, shown in
Figure 19, especially at long horizons. This difference is reflected in a substantial
increase in the average interval length, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 18.
This increase in variability is consistent with the less parametric nature of the LP
estimator.
Returning to the first panel of Figure 18, we see that the bias-adjusted VAR
bootstrap interval generally does fairly well at all horizons, with a tendency for the
coverage accuracy to decline slightly as B11 increases. In contrast, the LP percentile
bootstrap interval is even less accurate than the asymptotic LP interval in many
cases, except at short horizons. The reason is that the bootstrap tends to amplify the
bias in the initial point estimates, much like in the case of the Runkle (1987) VAR
bootstrap method (see Kilian 1998a). To overcome that problem would require a bias
adjustment of the LP regressions, but such an adjustment is not straightforward since
there are no closed form solutions, nor does the block bootstrap method lend itself
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to bias adjustments.
To summarize, we find that, contrary to the conjecture in the introduction, there
is no evidence that the LP impulse response estimator has lower bias than the VAR
estimator, while the conjecture that the LP estimator has higher variance proved
to be correct. Thus, local projections tend to deliver less accurate point estimates
of impulse responses in terms of the MSE. As for inference, we found that the bias-
corrected bootstrap interval for VAR models dominates all other pointwise confidence
intervals in this simulation example. Moreover, there is no evidence that bootstrap-
ping improves the accuracy of LP confidence intervals.
3.3.2 Joint Intervals
Table 17 investigates the coverage accuracy and average length of the corresponding
asymptotic joint intervals. In computing the coverage accuracy of the nominal 95%
joint interval, we compute the relative frequency with which the interval estimator
includes the entire true response function within the interval bounds. Thus, there
is one coverage rate for each of the four impulse response functions. We find that
the joint VAR interval is typically more accurate than the joint LP interval. The
coverage rate of the nominal 95% joint VAR interval ranges from 86% to 98%. The
corresponding results for the joint LP interval range from 80% to 91%. At the same
time, the average interval length of the joint LP interval is always greater than that
of the joint VAR interval, often by a factor of more than two. Thus, neither type of
joint interval necessarily comes close to nominal coverage, even in this simple model.
These estimates are based on the closed-form solution of the asymptotic variance
provided in Jordà (2007). We also investigated the extent to which the accuracy of
these intervals can be improved by estimating the joint variance-covariance matrix
of the impulse response coefficient estimators by bootstrap methods. We found that
substituting suitably constructed bootstrap estimates of this matrix based on 2,000
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bootstrap draws did not improve the accuracy of either the VAR or LP interval. The
relative ranking of the two methods remained unchanged. These additional results
are not shown to conserve space.63
3.3.3 Larger Sample Sizes
The preceding analysis highlighted some practical limitations of the LP method in
small samples. It is clear that, as the sample size increases, the performance of the
LP point and interval estimators will improve. As expected, doubling the sample size
from T = 100 to T = 200 greatly reduces the bias and variance of the LP estimator
and improves the accuracy of the pointwise asymptotic LP interval to near nominal
coverage even for B11 = 0.97, while reducing its average length. Although the asymp-
totic LP intervals for T = 200 are about as accurate as the VAR bootstrap intervals,
they remain about three times as wide on average, however. Thus, one would still
prefer the VAR-based interval for pointwise inference. For the joint intervals coverage
improves for T = 200, but not dramatically so. The accuracy of the LP and VAR
intervals becomes more similar. The joint VAR interval has coverage rates between
88% and 98%; the joint LP interval between 88% and 96%. For a given response
function, the ranking by accuracy is in general ambiguous, but the joint LP interval
always is considerably wider on average.
3.4 Four-Variable VAR(12) Model
The preceding results were confined to a stylized VAR(1) model. In this section we
demonstrate that our main conclusions continue to hold in a realistic example with
many lags and variables. Our example is a prototypical partially identified four-
63We did not attempt to construct joint intervals based on the bootstrap. While it would not be
difficult to simulate the joint distribution of the pointwise impulse response estimators, the resulting
confidence region could not be displayed easily. It was this fact that prompted Jordà (2007) to
propose the use of Scheffé’s (1953) S-method resulting in the asymptotic joint interval defined in
section 3.2.
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variable VAR model of the type commonly employed in the analysis of monetary
policy shocks (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999). We postulate a




model is the notion that the Federal Reserve sets the interest rate (it), conditional on
all past data, as a function of the current inflation rate (πt) and output gap (gapt).
We follow the literature in augmenting the model with the growth rate in real in-
dustrial commodity prices, as a leading indicator of inflationary pressures (πRPCOMt ).
The presumption is that this additional variable helps alleviate the well-known price
puzzle. The model is semi-structural in that only the monetary policy shock is iden-
tified. As is standard in this literature, the identifying assumption is that there is
no contemporaneous feedback from policy decisions to the output gap, to commodity
prices, or to the inflation rate. We specify the model at monthly frequency since the
identifying assumptions are more credible at monthly than at quarterly frequency.
This system is similar to models discussed in Christiano et al. (1999) and closely
resembles the VAR model of Bernanke and Gertler (1995). One difference between
their models and this model is that our measure of output is broader and clearly
stationary and that in our model the price level is specified in log-differences. This
transformation ensures that the model is stationary, if still persistent. That fact is
important since the maintained assumption in this paper is stationarity. The sample
period is January 1970 through December 2007. We also repeated our analysis for
subsamples. The simulation results were qualitatively similar and are not reported.
Our measure of inflation is based on the seasonally adjusted monthly CPI for all
urban consumers. Real commodity price inflation is constructed as the change in the
Commodity Research Board’s price index for raw industrials adjusted for CPI infla-
tion. The Federal Funds rates serves as our proxy for the interest rate. Our measure
of the real output gap is the CFNAI, a weighted average of a multitude of monthly
indicators of U.S. real economic activity, constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of
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Chicago. This is a principal components index based on 85 real indicators including
measures of production, income, employment, and consumption. It is constructed
to have an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one and is stationary
by construction. The CFNAI can be interpreted as a measure of the U.S. business
cycle. The use of the CFNAI has several advantages relative to other output mea-
sures. First, real GDP data are not available at monthly frequency and industrial
production data capture only a small and declining share of output. Second, it is well
established that the Federal Reserve considers many measures of real output rather
than one time series only (see, e.g., Evans 1999). The use of principal components
allows us to capture a broader set of business cycle indicators. Third, conventional
measures of output tend to imply implausibly large and persistent effects of mone-
tary policy shocks on output, whereas our measure generates the expected temporary
response. This result is in line with recent work stressing the importance of incorpo-
rating information from larger data sets in VAR models (see, e.g., Stock and Watson
2005; Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin 2008).
3.4.1 Simulation Evidence
Figure 20 shows effective coverage rates and average lengths of alternative pointwise
confidence intervals up to a horizon of H = 24. These are obtained by generating
1,000 trials of the same length as the original data from the VAR(12) model fitted
on the actual data. In that simulation exercise, the VAR error term is assumed to be
Gaussian. The lag orders of the fitted regression models are obtained using the AIC
with an upper bound of twelve lags.
We focus on the responses of the output gap, of CPI inflation and of real commod-
ity price inflation to an unanticipated monetary policy tightening. Figure 20 reveals
severe coverage deficiencies for the LP bootstrap interval especially at long horizons.
Its coverage rates may drop as low as 75%. The asymptotic LP method is fairly accu-
105
rate at short horizons (except on impact), but its coverage accuracy also deteriorates
at longer horizons. For example, for the output gap its coverage rate may drop as low
as 90%, for the inflation rate as low as 88% and for real commodity price inflation
as low as 82%. In contrast, both the asymptotic VAR interval and the bias-adjusted
bootstrap VAR interval are consistently quite accurate. If anything, their coverage
is excessive. Moreover, there is little to choose between the two VAR intervals in
terms of their average length. The VAR intervals not only tend to be more accurate,
but also systematically shorter than the LP intervals. The asymptotic LP interval
is sometimes more than twice as wide on average as the other intervals. Even the
bootstrap LP interval, however, tends to be wider than the VAR intervals.
Similarly, when it comes to point estimates of the impulse responses, Figure 21
shows that the LP estimator has higher bias in most cases as well as higher variance,
resulting in unambiguously higher MSEs. These results are very much consistent with
the insights obtained from the stylized VAR(1) model.
Table 18 shows the corresponding results for the joint interval. Here the results
differ somewhat from the VAR(1) data generating process in that the joint LP interval
has typically more accurate coverage with rates between 88% and 94%. In contrast,
the accuracy of the joint VAR interval is typically lower and more erratic with rates
between 61% and 88%. As in the VAR(1) example, the joint LP interval is much wider
on average often by a factor of more than three. This conclusion is further supported
by results for subsamples, which generally produced much less accurate results for
both methods. For example, if we restrict the sample to the pre-Greenspan period
of 1970.1-1987.8, joint coverage rates drop as low as 33% for the VAR interval and
as low as 36% for the LP interval. Moreover, the rankings of the two methods are
mixed. We infer that joint intervals are unlikely to be reliable in practice, and that
neither joint interval is clearly preferred over the other.
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3.4.2 Empirical Application
We conclude this section with an illustration of how different methods of inference
and choices of models may affect the consensus about the responses of macroeconomic
aggregates to an unanticipated monetary policy tightening. The data and model are
identical with the model used as a data generating process in this section. The first
row of Figure 22 shows the responses estimated by the VAR model and the second row
the responses estimated by local projections. The point estimates are plotted together
with conventional pointwise nominal 95% confidence intervals. The VAR estimates
suggest that the output gap temporarily turns negative with a full recovery within
two years. The temporary decline is highly statistically significant. Real commodity
price inflation also drops significantly. There is no evidence that CPI inflation is
significantly reduced. Rather the inflation response exhibits the well known price
puzzle with a statistically significant peak after two months. There is little to choose
between bias-corrected bootstrap and delta method intervals in this application.
The LP estimates in the second row paint a very similar picture. The main
difference is that the intervals tend to be substantially wider, lowering the statistical
significance, and that the estimates are more erratic. Both findings are expected based
on the earlier Monte Carlo simulation evidence. The pointwise bootstrap LP intervals
are so wide at short horizons that not even the price puzzle remains significant. In
contrast, based on the asymptotic LP interval the price puzzle remains.
Figure 23 compares the pointwise and joint confidence intervals for the same ex-
ample. The first row illustrates that the joint VAR intervals are similar to pointwise
intervals at short horizons, but systematically wider at long horizons. A similar pat-
tern applies to the LP intervals in the second row. At short horizons the joint and
pointwise asymptotic intervals are quite similar. At longer horizons, discrepancies
emerge, as the joint interval widens disproportionately. Compared with the joint
VAR intervals, these intervals are substantially wider, as predicted by the simulation
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study.
These differences do not necessarily affect the substantive conclusions, however,
because statistically significant point estimates tend to be concentrated at short hori-
zons, when joint and pointwise intervals tend to be similar. For the VAR results, for
none of the three response functions the use of joint intervals overturns the finding
of a significant response function. For the LP results, both the price puzzle and the
output contraction remain statistically significant, if barely so, even using the joint
interval. Thus, at least in this empirical example, the use of LP models as opposed
to VAR models and the use of joint intervals as opposed to pointwise intervals makes
little difference for the main conclusions.
3.5 Approximate VAR Models
Based on the simulation results presented so far, there is no compelling reason to
abandon traditional VAR methods of constructing impulse response estimates in fa-
vor of the LP method. As long as the finite lag order VAR model provides a good
approximation to the stationary data generating process, the LP estimator suffers
from greater small-sample bias and higher variance, resulting in very wide, yet of-
ten still inaccurate confidence intervals and erratic point estimates. An interesting
avenue for future research is to investigate how poor the vector autoregressive ap-
proximation has to be for the LP method to become an attractive alternative to VAR
approximations. For example, more general linear stationary processes can be repre-
sented as a VAR(∞) model and approximated by a sequence of finite-lag order vector
autoregressions (see, e.g., Lütkepohl and Poskitt 1991; Inoue and Kilian 2002).
In this section, we provide some preliminary evidence based on a tri-variate in-
vertible VARMA(1,1)-DGP used as an example in Braun and Mittnik (1993) and
Inoue and Kilian (2002). The model includes quarterly investment growth, deflator
inflation and the commercial paper rate in this order:
108


















This model can be represented as a recursively identified VAR(∞) process which
can be approximated using either local projections or a finite-lag order VAR model.
We follow Inoue and Kilian (2002) in studying the response of the model variables to
an innovation in the commercial paper rate. We focus on the asymptotic LP interval
and the bias-adjusted bootstrap algorithm for VAR models.64 The sample size is
T = 200. Figure 24 shows results for approximating lag orders of p = 5 and q = 5.
The simulation results are remarkably robust to changes in these lag orders. Only for
very low lag orders, the coverage accuracy deteriorates.
The bias-adjusted bootstrap method performs quite well, as illustrated in Figure
24. Based on the approximating VAR(5) model, its coverage rate is near the nominal
coverage for all three responses. Interestingly, Figure 24 suggests that, for a suitably
large choice of q, the asymptotic LP interval is just as accurate, but its average width
is systematically wider by a factor of about three. Thus, the VARMA-DGP results
are quite similar to the results we obtained earlier for finite-lag order VAR models for
large T . This tentative evidence suggests that it is not clear that there are advantages
to the LP approach, even if the VAR model is merely an approximation to the data
generating process.
64Inoue and Kilian (2002) discuss the validity of the bootstrap for stationary VAR(∞) processes
and show that this specific bootstrap approach performs better than the delta method interval
proposed in Lütkepohl and Poskitt (1991).
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3.6 Conclusion
Local projections methods are a promising recent development in the literature on
impulse response analysis, but little is known about their finite sample performance
and their merits relative to more conventional VAR-based methods. In this paper, we
compared the small-sample performance of impulse response confidence intervals and
point estimates based on local (linear) projections and VAR models. We explored
and compared alternative approaches to implementing the LP method in stationary
ennvironments and developed suitable bootstrap methods of inference.
Our main objective was to investigate the conjecture that LP intervals may help
resolve the long-standing problem of bias driven by the nonlinearity of the VAR
impulse-response estimator. This bias tends to undermine Gaussian approximations
to the finite-sample distribution of the impulse response in vector autoregressions,
resulting in confidence intervals with poor coverage accuracy. Since LP impulse re-
sponses can be represented as slope coefficients in a linear model, our conjecture was
that confidence intervals based on the LP model might be more accurate in practice
than VAR based intervals.
We showed that this conjecture is not correct. In particular, we found that the bias
of the LP estimator is greater than the bias of the VAR impulse response estimator,
notwithstanding the linearity of the LP estimator in the slope parameters. Combined
with its excessive variability, the LP point estimator proved to be very unreliable. The
accuracy of the LP interval estimator tended to be erratic in small samples. Although
the asymptotic LP interval was more accurate than some VAR-based alternatives such
as the delta method interval, neither the asymptotic nor the bootstrap LP interval
proved more accurate than bias-adjusted bootstrap intervals for VAR models. We
concluded that there is no compelling reason to abandon traditional VAR methods
of constructing impulse response estimates in favor of the LP method, as long as
the finite lag order VAR model provides a good approximation to the data generating
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process. While the accuracy of LP estimators quickly improves with increasing sample
size, the average width of the asymptotic LP interval far exceeds that of bias-adjusted
VAR bootstrap intervals with similar accuracy. Thus, even for large samples there
are no apparent advantages to the LP method. This result tends to hold even when
the data are generated by a stationary VAR(∞) process.
We also investigated the reliability of the joint impulse response confidence inter-
vals proposed by Jordà (2007) for both VAR and LP models. Such intervals are of
great potential interest for applied work, given the dependence of impulse response
estimates across horizons. We concluded that these joint intervals were not accurate
enough to be recommended for realistic applications. This conclusion held whether
these intervals were constructed based on the VAR or the LP approach. An empir-
ical application illustrated that joint VAR intervals tend to be similar to pointwise
intervals at short horizons. Only at longer horizons they become substantially wider
than pointwise intervals. Since most statistically significant results in applied work
are obtained at short horizons, there is reason to believe that in most cases the use
of joint intervals is unlikely to overturn the substantive conclusions of studies based
on more conventional pointwise intervals.
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Table 16: Models for Estimating Impulse Responses and Methods of Inference
Inference
Pointwise Interval Joint Interval
Model Asymptotic Bootstrap Asymptotic
VAR (1) (2) (5)
LP (3) (4) (6)
Figure 18: Coverage Rates and Average Lengths of 95% Pointwise Confidence Inter-
vals for θ21,h
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VAR asymptotic VAR bootstrap LP asymptotic LP bootstrap
Notes: Simulation results based on 1,000 trials of length T=100 from the VAR(1) DGP described in text. VAR
asymptotic denotes the asymptotic delta method for VAR impulse responses. VAR bootstrap refers to the bias-
corrected bootstrap method for VAR impulse responses. LP asymptotic is the asymptotic interval for LPs. LP
bootstrap refers to a block bootstrap interval for LPs. All lag orders are selected by the AIC with an upper bound of
four lags for all methods.
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Figure 19: Bias, Standard Deviation, and MSE of θ̂21,h
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Notes: Based on 5,000 trials.
Table 17: Coverage Rates and Average Lengths of Asymptotic 95% Joint Confidence
Intervals for θij in the VAR(1) DGP
VAR LP
B11=0.5 B11=0.9 B11=0.97 B11=0.5 B11=0.9 B11=0.97
Coverage Rate
θ11 0.868 0.882 0.859 0.816 0.874 0.849
θ12 0.977 0.979 0.980 0.822 0.905 0.904
θ21 0.899 0.907 0.896 0.867 0.872 0.843
θ22 0.892 0.897 0.884 0.798 0.800 0.798
Average Length
θ11 0.513 1.395 1.829 1.239 3.323 4.195
θ12 0.494 1.351 1.767 1.203 3.202 4.025
θ21 0.782 1.428 1.751 1.886 3.310 3.898
θ22 0.764 1.369 1.664 1.853 3.249 3.809
Notes: Simulation results based on 1,000 trials from the VAR(1) DGP described in text.
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Figure 20: Coverage Rates and Average Lengths of 95% Pointwise Confidence Inter-
vals for Responses to a Monetary Tightening
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VAR asymptotic VAR bootstrap LP asymptotic LP bootstrap
Notes: Simulation results are based on 1,000 trials of length 456 from the VAR(12) model described in the text. Gap
denotes the CFNAI, π is CPI inflation, and πRPCOM is real commodity price inflation. VAR asymptotic refers to the
delta method interval for VAR impulse responses. VAR bootstrap refers to the bias-adjusted bootstrap method for
VAR models. LP asymptotic refers to asymptotic interval for LP models. LP bootstrap refers to the block bootstrap
interval for LP models. Lag orders are selected by the AIC with an upper bound of 12 lags in all cases. Since there
is no uncertainty about the impact response of these variables, we do not construct a coverage rate for horizon 0.
Table 18: Coverage Rates and Average Lengths of Asymptotic 95% Joint Confidence













Figure 21: Bias, Standard Deviation, and MSE of Impulse Responses to a Monetary
Tightening
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Notes: Based on 5,000 trials.
Figure 22: Responses to a Monetary Tightening with 95% Pointwise Confidence In-
tervals
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Point Estimates Asymptotic Pointwise Interval Bootstrap Pointwise Interval
Notes: The lag orders were chosen by the AIC with an upper bound of 12 lags.
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Figure 23: Responses to a Monetary Tightening with 95% Pointwise and Joint Con-
fidence Intervals
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Point Estimates Asymptotic Pointwise Interval Bootstrap Pointwise Interval Asymptotic Joint Interval
Notes: See Figure 22.
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Figure 24: Coverage Rates and Average Lengths of 95% Pointwise Confidence Inter-
vals for Responses to an Interest Rate Innovation
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VAR bootstrap LP asymptotic
Notes: Simulation results for T = 200 based on 1,000 trials from the VARMA(1,1)-DGP described in Inoue and
Kilian (2002). VAR bootstrap refers to the bias-adjusted bootstrap method for VAR models. LP asymptotic refers
to asymptotic interval for LP models.The approximating lag orders are p = 5 and q = 5. The results are robust to
reasonable changes in the lag order, as long as the lag orders are not too small.
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